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Abstract
The dissertation examines the role the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and
the  Economic  Community  of  West  African  States  (ECOWAS)  can  play  in  facilitating  the
political  and  economic  convergence  of  the  African  Union  (AU)  member  states. The
developmental challenges facing Africa in spite of its wealth of human and natural resources is
poignant. The genesis of this problem can be traced to the history of colonialism and the wave of
independence in the continent in the late 1950s.   Arguments have been put forward to suggest
that  one  of  the  most  viable  ways  of  promoting  Africa’s  development  is  by  developing  and
promoting  intra-continental  trade  which can be possible  through continental  integration. The
specific areas reviewed are regional stability and how intra-regional trade and investment is used
to  promote  economic  convergence.  Africa's  need for  political  and economic  integration  at  a
continental level is further sustained by the assumption that neocolonialism can be blamed for
the weakness of structures in African states. Some scholars agree on the idea that regionalisation
is often seen to offer a possibility to respond to the challenges of globalization.  This impact
nevertheless is dependent on the relation between globalisation and regional sentiment. Regional
integration implies a form of interdependence among nation-states. Such interdependence leads
to  an  establishment  of  regional  integration  arrangements  between  sovereign  states  within  a
geographical space. These agreements are shaped formally and there is a commitment to work
together in order to realise political and socio-economic benefits. 
This study maintains that in order to achieve effective integration of the continent, Nigeria and
South Africa as case studies, as continental giants have a key role to play to this end and as
members  of  ECOWAS and  SADC respectively.  It  is  argued  here  that  both  the  SADC and
ECOWAS as sub-continental  blocks have made some notable and commendable progress in
developing  policies  for  trade  liberalization  and  economic  integration,  this,  however,  is  not
enough as such policies are also pertinent at a continental level. The study found that SADC and
ECOWAS  as  regional  blocks  can  play  a  role  in  aiding  the  continent  to  achieve  a  trade
liberalization to achieve continental economic development. 
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Chapter One: Orientation of the Study
1.1. Introduction  
African integration  has been one of  the main bases for the founding of the Organisation of
African Unity (OAU) in 1963. The creation of this union was championed by Ghana’s Kwame
Nkrumah,  Ethiopia’s  Haile  Selassie,  Morocco’s  King  Hassan  II,  Gamal  Nasser  of  Egypt,
Boumedienne of Algeria, Sekou Toure of Guinea, Keita of Mali, Julius Nyerere of Tanzania to
mention  a  few.  The  goal  as  advocated  by  Nkrumah was  to  achieve  economic  and political
integration of the then OAU member states. This was so as to address the effects and impact of
colonization  on  the  continent,  and  how to  expedite  economic  development  given  such.  The
rationale  is  that  through  continental  integration,  the  developmental  challenges  that  face  the
continent can be adequately addressed. In lieu of this, this chapter outlines the background of the
study and the overall orientation of the study. The chapter also elucidates presents the research
problem and the research questions that guide the purview of the study. 
1.2 Background
It is has been established that one of the lasting effects of colonization in Africa, is a dependence
of  the West,  ergo,  neocolonialism.  Successive policies  and extant  reality  bear  evidence  to  a
divergence of view; the current state of the continent suggests a difference in view between the
erstwhile colonial masters and the rulers of Africa. There are developmental challenges that are a
consequence  of  semantics.  Questions  on  the  interpretation  and  motives  for  the  West’s
involvement in Africa’s development persist till today. The manner at which how each side looks
at  the  development  and  whose  obligation  it  is  to  tackle  development  matters  even  in  post-
independence. For instance, the West still exploit their colonies in the guise of “development”; a
development that usually happens with the extraction of mineral wealth and natural resources
from the continent (Arndt, 1981: 54-56). 
A historical exegesis of the French colonial past, for instance, would show the French system of
assimilation made the colonized countries just appendix of the French state, a backyard to dump
what they like and take what they want. There was a particular form of violence with which the
French  curled  any  attempt  at  some  form  of  integration  that  was  required  to  fight  for
independence.  The  same  is  visible  in  nature  or  the  way  by  which  those  states  that  sought
liberation  were  punished.  During  the  fight  for  independence,  Guinea’s  President  Toure  and
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Mali’s President Keita attempted to provide support for the independence movement of other
francophone countries, they were punished by the French by being severed from any political
and economic cooperation. It was meant to forestall such attempts for independence by other
French colonies in Africa
It  is  argued that the model  of development  is  designed to ensure African independent  states
continue to depend on the former colonizers. In that manner, it could be seen that the former
colonizer’s interest will be served, rather promote development in African. It was in that light
Kwame Nkrumah (1963: 150) who was first to succeed in making Ghana (formerly Gold Coast)
the first African independent state minced no words saying:
The economic weakness of the new African states has been inherited from the
colonial background, which subordinated their development to the needs of the
colonial powers. To reverse the position and bring Africa into the realm of highly
productive  modem  nations,  calls  for  a  gigantic  self-help  programme.  Such  a
programme can only be produced and implemented by integrated planning within
an over-all policy decided by a continental authority.
Again, scholars suggest that certain systems like democracy were systemic was in which the
West imposed structures that chain African states to their European former masters and serve
their  interest  on  obtaining  natural  and  economic  resources  from the  continent  cheaply.  The
inevitable fact is that the development of the continent would constitute, perhaps, the economic
cost to the West where natural resources could not be exploited easily because of geographical
factors  among  others.  Nkrumah  (1963:  154)  points  out  that  the  European  demand  for  raw
materials  meant  severing  intra-continent  trading  among  African  people  as  existed  before
colonization; it started from east to west “Kukuwa, the famous capital  of the state of Borno;
Kano,  the centre  of  the African caravan trade;  Salaga,  the  major  kola market  in  Dagoumba
country, and finally Kong, at the head of one of the main caravan trade routes linking the Middle
East and West Africa” (Adotevi 1997: 63). This was discouraged by colonial establishments to
divert trading outward bound, which reinforced African dependent on the West by having only
the northbound economic link, but not on the continent among African states themselves after
balkanizations. Nkrumah said,
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At  the  present  time,  commerce  and  the  exchange  of  goods  between  African
countries is small. Colonialism interrupted the interchange that existed before its
incursion  and  subsequently  all  forms  of  communication  -  roads,  railways,
harbours - were pointed outwards, the necessary auxiliary arms for transporting
raw materials from their African sources to their European convertors overseas.
Additionally, as the West made advances during the industrialization revolution, Africa and the
rest of Asia, due to their population serve as markets for manufactured products from the West,
on the one hand, resources are  extracted,  and they are then sold back to people in  low and
middle-income countries at a great cost. The need for regional integration is underscored by the
notion that only Africans can find solutions to their problems. As such, all forms of economic
and  trade  integration  and  the  presence  of  supranational  bodies  bodes  well  for  Africa’s
development.  
1.3 Research Problem & Study Rationale
The key hindrance to effective integration in the AU and its sub-regional blocs remains
paternalistic colonial affinities. African countries regard ties with ex-colonialists as more
essential than forging for continental unity. On the other side, some former colonialists
see a united Africa, integration of the continent as a serious obstacle to peculiar interests
derived  from,  particularly,  former  colonies.  Differing  colonial  histories  and  internal
contradictions of the African countries have tended to be a major obstacle  in forging
unity in sub-regions and the continent (Heinonen, 2006: 191). This study aims to examine
factors that prevent continental integration and the role of ECOWAS and SADC to this
end. 
1.4 Objectives
The main objectives of the research are:
⮚ To understand the nature of regional integration and how it manifests in Africa; 
⮚ To explore the Afrocentric view of regional integration;
12
⮚ To examine the role of regional bodies to promoting continental integration. 
1.4.1 Research Questions
To achieve the above research goals the following questions served as a guide for the
study:
i. What factors hinder continental integration in the African?
ii. How does African Integration feature into the mandate of SADC and ECOWAS?
iii. What  is  the  role  of  ECOWAS  and  the  SADC  with  respect  to  promoting
continental integration?
1.5 Research Methodology 
This study is a desktop qualitative one. A qualitative research method is explained as a process
of naturalistic enquiry that seeks an in-depth understanding of social  phenomena within their
natural setting. It focuses on the direct experiences of human beings as meaning-making agents
in their everyday lives. Researchers who use qualitative methods seek a deeper truth. They aim
to study things in their natural setting, attempting to make sense of, or interpret, phenomena in
terms of the meanings people bring to them and they use a holistic perspective which preserves
the complexities of human behaviour (Greenhalgh & Taylor 1997:740). 
The  data  used  in  this  study  are  sourced  from  secondary  sources;  library  books,  academic
journals,  dissertations  and  theses  and  online  resources.Given  that  data  were  derived  from
secondary  sources,  the  study  finds  content  analysis  as  an  appropriate  method  for  analysis.
Content  analysis  is  a  research  technique  used  by  researchers  to  make  replicable  and  valid
inferences  by  interpreting  and  coding  textual  material.  The  findings  are  generated  from
information gathered from literature, which is further analyzed within a framework developed
from general systems theory and other conducive concept.
Content analysis digs deeper into the content of the book or an article in an attempt to make
sense of that cont. I other words it  tries to “determine the textual meaning” (Gheyle,  2017).
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According to Krippendorff (2004) content analysis is a “research technique for making replicable
and valid references from the texts to the context of their use”.  Content analysis operates on the
basis of inferences since “conclusions are drawn from certain premises and samples through an
inductive  and  deductive  process”  (Kippendorff,  2004).  (White  and  Marsh,  2006)  argue  that
“content  analysts  use  some  guidelines  for  inference  (based  on  existing  theories,  previous
research, and experience) and strict procedural (coding) rules to move from unstructured texts to
their research questions”. Basically content analysis focuses on meaning and context. 
According to White and Marsh (2006) “the main elements of content analysis are the generation
of hypothesis, sampling of data, and a clear coding scheme. It implies a deductive approach,
whereby categories are decided upon from the beginning, and unambiguous coding rules are laid
out to know what goes where. After coding, statistical tools are used to analyze the results and
also to test for their reliability and validity”.
Sampling 
Sampling means selecting a certain portion of units from a larger population group. According to
Kippendorff (2004) this process is done on “random basis, meaning that every element stands an
equal chance to be selected”. For example if you want know about the press coverage of a certain
event and you decide to collect all newspaper articles that relate to that event, those newspaper
articles constitute your population. 
Coding
Coding is defined by White and Marsh (2004) as the “process of coding unstructured text into
categories (inductively or deductively)”. They argue that categories and coding rules should be
crystal clear and exhaustive and mutually exclusive”. The coding rules must be as unambiguous
as possible so that the individual coder would categorize and label units in one and the same
way. Coding rules are written down in codebooks.  
Reliability
White and Marsh (2004) argue that reliability is the “most important test in content analysis,
especially when human coding is involved since it implies coding results should be the same
(replicable) when different persons are given a certain coding scheme”. 
Validity
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According to White and Marsh (2004) “Validity is the degree to which a measuring procedure
represents only the intended concept”. The researcher must ensure that he is measuring what he
wants to know. Validity  can take the form of “triangulation  when it  lends credibility  to the
findings  by  incorporating  multiple  sources  of  data,  methods  or  theories”  (Marsh  and white,
2004). Shapiro and Markoff (1997) assert that content analysis is only valid and meaningful to
the extent that results are related to other measures. 
1.6 Structure of the Dissertation
The dissertation is structured into five chapters of parallel analysis method used to look at two
different scenario cases. It begins with:
Chapter 1: This chapter presents a broad overview of the study, by highlighting the background
of the research, the research questions, research objectives and research methods.
Chapter 2: Chapter two engages in an extensive review of the literature review and also engages
with the theoretical framework 
Chapter  3: Chapter  three  provides  a  contextual  analysis  of  ECOWAS and SADC and also
provides clarification on some key concepts and practices.
Chapter  4:  This  will  include  and  in-depth  analysis  of  the  different  legal  framework  and
governance structures of the SADC
Chapter 5: Presents an investigation into the benefits of integration and how it has impacted on
the different regional blocs. Additionally, the chapter explores how SADC and ECOWAS can
play a part in continental convergence.Chapter 6: In this chapter, a chapter by chapter summary
is presented. This is in addition to making recommendations for further studies and a general
conclusion of the study. 
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Chapter Two: Literature review and Theoretical Framework
2.1 Introduction
The developmental challenges facing Africa in spite of its wealth of human and natural resources
is poignant. The genesis of this problem can be traced to the history of colonialism and the wave
of independence in the continent in the late 1950s. As Kwame Nkrumah (1963: 160) points out
that during the first few years post-independence, the nascent governments of the newly formed
African states were encouraged to join the European Common Market for the benefit of aids and
development grants. These states were however not aware and did not consider how that could
lead  to  a  dependency on the  former  colonial  masters.  Arguments  have  been put  forward  to
suggest that one of the most viable ways of promoting Africa’s development is by developing
and promoting  intra-continental  trade  which  can  be  possible  through continental  integration.
Africa's need for political and economic integration at a continental level is further propped by
the supposition that neocolonialism can be blamed for the weakness of structures in African
states. The effect is so perduring and Nkrumah (1963) suggests that the weakness of independent
African  states  caused  by  the  exploitation  of  colonization  hinders  development  and  can  be
addressed by a pursuit of regionalism. Nkrumah cited a number of economic projects potential
can materialized by the collective synergy of an integrated region. He decried sub-regionalism as
"inter-territorial  associations"  which  does  not  necessarily  bring  about  an  envisioned
development.  Nkrumah's  insistence  on  continental  integration  could  not  be  comprised  to
anything else that  can bring Africans  together  to  attain  stature where its  human and natural
resource could be developed faster than an individual state could on its sole arm achieve. This
chapter begins by clarifying some key concepts and terms, it then proceeds to engage in a review
of literature that is of pertinence to the topic under investigation. 
2.2 Regionalism 
Regionalism as a concept is used in reference to formal cooperation and integration structure of a
group of countries who share a spatial or common geographical space. The goal of such formal
cooperation is in order to facilitate and enhance a sense of shared identity, purpose and intent.
This formal cooperation and integration bring about the establishment of institutions that mould
and drive the common goals of the group (Lamberte, 2004:4). According to Jiboku (2014:8), 
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Defining  the  concept  of  regionalism,  regional  cooperation  and  regional  integration  are  two
distinct concepts often used together. The two concepts refer to the idea of bringing different
units together for different types of economic and political interactions. However, identifying key
items that distinguish these concepts enhances an understanding of the dynamism of regionalism
in different parts of the developed and developing world.
Again,  regionalism has been described in different  shades and hues;  by both politicians  and
scholars alike. Some authors and scholars agree on the idea that regionalisation is often seen to
offer  a  possibility  to  respond to the  challenges  of  globalization.  This  impact  nevertheless  is
dependent  on the  relation  between  globalisation  and regional  sentiments  about  it  (Heininen,
2006: 32-33; Hettne 1999b). Globalisation has brought about diverse effects and responses. In
some cases, certain regions are compelled to organize in leagues or bloc to harness or challenge
the effects of globalisation by resorting to integration (McKay et al, 2004: 8f; World Bank 2000).
The North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) for instance was a response to the European
Union Maastricht treaty. Nkrumah (1963: 164-165) explains regionalism as being “based upon
economic and cultural identification and co-operation.” He sees that not as a necessary check on
capitalist globalization but mutual cooperation inspired by implicit “limited” circumstances of
each state involved in the process. 
2.2.1 Regional Cooperation and Political Integration
Lambert (2004:4) describes regional cooperation as a situation where nation-states come together
and  pool  their  efforts  towards  achieving  specific  objectives.  It  may  not  necessarily  involve
committing themselves to integrate their independent economies. These states are interested in
actualizing objectives,  which may not be possible if  they were acting unilaterally.  Similarly,
Adetula (2014) reports that regional integration implies a form of interdependence among nation-
states. Such an interdependence leads to an establishment of regional integration arrangements
between sovereign states within a geographical space. These agreements are shaped formally and
there  is  a  commitment  to  work  together  in  order  to  actualise  political  and  socio-economic
benefits. More importantly, regional integration brings about the rise in supranational authorities
who require independent nation-states to, in a manner of speaking cede certain aspect of their
national sovereignty, “make political commitments and sacrifices and forego certain benefits in
the  interest  of  the  larger  body  (Adetula  2004,  p3).  According  to  Lambert  (2004:4)  “most
initiatives are ‘policy-induced integration’, the net result of regional cooperation”.
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The term integration can further be “understood as uniting and centralization,  the integration
always  could  be  connected  and  based  on  several  conditions  and  elements  which  are  (i)
Establishing  unified law frame,  (ii)  Creating  common institutions,  (iii)  Developing decision-
making  centre,  and  (iv)  Projecting  identity.”   Ilievski  identifies  the  EU as  the  first  kind  of
political  integration  thus  “the  integration  in  a  political  sense  and  narrowly,  the  political
integration could be identified in the European Union. The European Union is the first project
following the integration in a political sense, based on the theory of neo-functionalism. Base on
the foregoing, the “concept of political  integration is adopted as a theoretical  concept and is
transformed in empirical  reality.”   According to Haas (1968: 16) political  integration is  "the
process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their
loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new centre, whose institutions possess or
demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states" (Also cited in Heinenon 2006: 5).
Ernst Hass (1968: 16) defines integration as “the process whereby political  actors in several
distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities
toward a new centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over preexisting national
states.  The  end  result  of  a  process  of  political  integration  is  a  new  political  community,
superimposed over the pre-existing ones”. There are different ways or some variation in how
other scholars and experts define integration.
2.2.2 Transactional Integration
The transactional model of integration according Karl Deutsch is “the attainment, within
a territory, of a “sense of community” and of institutions and practices strong enough and
widespread enough to assure, for a “long” time, dependable expectations of “peaceful
change” among its population” (Deutsch et al, 1957: 5). The core focus of this type of
integration is on “security community” which is autonomous but is integrated to secure
their common interest in the foremost area of peace.  Deutsch et al (1957: 46-59) frame
five factors that are required for security community: (1) the compatibility of the main
values  2)  social  communication  between  integrating  units  (3)  mobility  of  persons
between  participating  units  (4)  multiplicity  and  balance  of  transactions  (5)  mutual
predictability of behaviour.
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2.3  Regionalism,  Continental  Integration  and  Development:  From  the  West  to
Africa
Regionalism  has  been  at  the  centre  of  several  debates  and  discourse  among  scholars  and
theorists. There has been an evolution of different perspectives on the concept and practice of
regionalism over  the  years.  Similarly,  the  theoretical  explanations  as  highlighted  by  Olivier
(2010:20-22) affirms the preceding. The polarity of debates are between not only over issues of
what constitutes a ‘region’ or who the members of a region represent but also on the motives and
interests that drive and sustain regionalism in different parts of the world. In Africa, for example,
there are further questions “on ‘what’ should be integrated and ‘how’ integration should proceed.
Thus, it has become the common approach to differentiate between ‘old’ and ‘new’ regionalism
and various types of regionalisation (Hettne and Soderbaum 1998, 3-4; 2000:3).
While regional integration is relatively a nascent practice in Africa, it was stated in Europe. The
need for integration of Western Europe became critical after the Second World War, as a means
to forestall any recurrence of such massively devastating wars. From a scholarly standpoint, it
was  seen  that  a  functional  unity  in  Western  Europe  which  focus  on  economic  unity,  could
prevent unwarranted aggression in mainland Europe. Hence, it would be interesting to have some
brief background at this stage into the EU integration.
Academic scholars and experts are credited with European integration; however, the initiative
depended on need for economic and political cooperation. The fact of well-established states and
their  right to statehood and sovereignty.  Like Africa,  the distinct  ethnolinguistic  and serious
Euro-tribal divisions, with an ancient origin in the height of the Greco-Roman times still  has
implications  for  unity  in  Europe.  Of  course,  much  of  those  far  ancient  backgrounds  are
reminiscent in the causes of war in Europe. For long, the propensity of recurring wars based on
these rudimentary factors have worried expects on the European agenda for peace and stability.
The evidence has been that many wars had happened on the European continent  besides the
modern time major wide scale wars dubbed World War I and World War II that extended beyond
the entire West.
Issues of economic and political polarities and fear of rogue states saddled Europe post-Hitler
era.  A  divided  Germany,  again,  over  political-economic  ideologies  served  as  schism  and
smouldering fire for possible recurrence of violence. Again, the Balkan regions sat on pent up
fits of anger over the same sectarian to tribal differences, for example, the Yugoslavia conflict
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has been one case of that. The Serbs and the Muslim Croats to the Albanians and potpourri of
diversity issues erupted into a major conflict in the latter part of the twentieth century. It drew the
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) immediate intervention and mandated by the United
Nations (UN) pursued that. These regions have not been part of the emerged European Union,
and therefore, it was not surprising nothing could come in a shared interest to prevent a major
full-scale war from occurring.  Actually,  the NATO twenty-nine member countries (Belgium,
Denmark,  France,  Iceland,  Italy,  Luxembourg,  The  Netherlands,  Norway,  Portugal,  UK,
Germany, Spain, Greece, Turkey, Finland, Austria, Czech, Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria, Croatia,
Slovakia, Albania, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Slovenia,  (USA and Canada are off the continent
though are members)) formed the basis of the formation of the European Union. But it should be
noted that the idea of EU was initiated before the collapse of the former Soviet Union which
resulted  in  the  fragmentation  of  the  Eastern  communist  bloc  countries  and many  joined the
NATO.
In Africa, the 1950 and 60s, Old regionalism spurred regional integration attempts during this
period.  Although such movements  “were inward-oriented;  explicit  about the objectives to be
achieved;  clear  about  the  programmes  and  had  restricted  membership  (Olivier,  2010:18-19;
Gilpin, 2001:341). Extant movements of regionalism have grown to be more inclusive, outward-
looking and associated with regional integration engagements from the 1990s (Olivier 2010, pp
18-19;  Gibb  2009,  p708).  More  so,  such  an  inclusive  and  outward-looking  approach  to
regionalism  establishes  “the  reality  of  growing  interdependence  of  nation-states  in  the
international political system. It makes it difficult to establish a general definition or theoretical
explanation of regionalism. To this extent, there is a growing recognition of the need to develop
a  new  regional  approach  towards  a  multi-dimensional,  broadly  focused  perspective  on
regionalism (Olivier, 2010:21).
More  recently,  in  the  past  two  decades,  the  shape  of  regional  cooperation  and  integration
arrangements have become ubiquitous in various parts of the world to so much so that it has
ensured that that almost all countries in the developed and developing worlds are members of the
particular regional or sub-regional bloc. In the developing world, in particular Africa, there has
been a growing interest and efforts to promote cooperation so as to ensure a mutually beneficial
relationship. This cooperation is not limited to the region of Africa alone as there is evidence of
cooperative arrangements between developed and developing countries. As Lamberte (2004:4)
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reports that there has been a rising “interest in cooperating to accomplish regional cooperation
projects  in  various  sectors;  promoting  research  activities;  and  creating  regional  bodies  that
regulate  diverse aspects  of economic policymaking”.  Accordingly,  the trajectory and tone of
regional integration agreements have increasingly been established as a strategy to respond to the
challenges  and  demands  of  a  fast  globalising  world  marked  with  an  array  of  technological
transformations  and development  (see,  Delvin  and Estevadeordal,  2002:2;  Olu-Adeyemi  and
Ayodele, 2007:214).
Adetula (2004) purports that regional integration in low middle-income countries suffers from a
policy and directional morass. According to him, regional integration in “countries in the less
developed world is particularly complex and different from what is obtainable in the developed
world because of  the  socio-economic  and political  dynamics  which  impact  on the process”.
Regional  integration  arrangements  in  the  African  continent  are  undergirded  by  certain  or
replicate  philosophical  premises  that  have  been  developed  generally  from  “the  practice  of
countries in the Western industrialised societies and each of the different types of integration
scheme has its distinct regularities, processes and method of operation” (Adetula, 2004:5).
Again,  Bertil  Odén  (1996)  reviewed  the  regional  integration  in  SADC,  she  identifies  and
proposes factors which have conceptual implications towards the kind of integration relevant in
the African context.  Odén emphasis is on development integration or neo-functionalism even
though other propositions to juxtapose these two. After deliberation on a number of areas of
integration Odén finds South Africa as a pivotal role player in SADC integration. She also finds
the private sector players as most active in facilitating the integration process, and she excoriates
the governmental actions as slow with bottlenecks which only protract simple procedures and
these have a significant negative impact on the success of integration. One of the issues raised by
Oden is the problem of economic disparity, and its implications for integration, especially in the
developing world. According to Odén (1996: 48), such challenges can be resolved by appropriate
models that have features of development-oriented integration and inclusion of new models or
continent specific models of integration.
In  accord  with  Odén’s  development  integration  model  is  the  economic  integration  model
suggested by Ivan Zyuulu, in his work on “Convergence in the SADC and African economic
integration  process:  prospects  and  statistical  issues.”  Zyuulu  emphasizes  macroeconomy  and
raise’s issues of economically weak states as sufficient indication and motivation for economic
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integration.  Furthermore,  Zyuulu  suggests  that  there  is  a  need  for  effective  macroeconomic
statistics which will serve to monitor the sub-regions macroeconomic trends. This according to
him  is  the  condition  sine  qua  non  for  successful  integration;  that  is  to  say,  if  economic
performance  can  be  improved,  regional  integration  will  bear  fruits.   In  other  for  economic
convergence to take shape functionally, Zyuulu explains the need for a certain level of agreement
satisfaction – “stable institutions, functioning market economy, removal of national barriers to
flow  of  funds  and  harmonisation  of  regulation  and  supervisory  standards  for  financial
institutions”.
 In addition or as would be expected such compliance can work under these four economic
convergence types: (i)A Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA), where partner countries offer each
other tariff reductions to a set of products; (ii) A Common Market is a form of integration which
establishes free trade in goods and services, sets common external tariff  among members, in
addition,  allows free mobility of capital  and labour;  (iii)  The other form of integration is an
Economic Union, which typically maintains free trade, set common external tariffs, free mobility
of capital and labour and also regulates some fiscal spending; (iv) The next stage of integration is
a Monetary Union whose salient feature includes a common currency among a group of member
countries. This paper has relevance in giving providing some timeline set for activities towards
integration:  “The  Southern  African  Development  Community  has  sequenced  a  number  of
activities in order to move toward economic integration in the sub-region. SADC launched a
Free  Trade  Area  in  August  2008.  According  to  the  SADC  Regional  Indicative  Strategic
Development  Plan (RISDP),  once the FTA is  attained,  Customs Union will  follow in 2010,
thereafter in 2015, a Common Market will be formed. In 2016 a monetary union will be formed
and a single currency will be introduced in 2018.” This information is a cue to investigate what
has happened and what has not and reasons.
Lere Amusan (2010) reviews SADC integration feasibility from a Pan-African perspective and
relegated the project as burdensome based on the suspicious role of South Africa. Such confirms
Gaddafi’s outright criticism of the sub-regional arrangement instead of making a serious stride
towards continental  integration.  Amusan has been critical  of SA on grounds of its economic
model as basic capitalism which does not only frighten the other divergent ideological side of the
states  in  the  region,  but  carries  the  suspicious  impression  of  a  hegemonic  pursuit  with  her
massive economic power and population which is better compared to that of other countries in
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the region. Whilst Amusan sees the relevance and needs for SADC integration as conditional to
the sub-region surmounting development hurdles, mutual trust is imperative; so as to allow SA
plays  its  role  in  openness and creates  room for  trust.  Amusan does not  perceive  the SADC
integration idea as trailing the path of Pan-Africanism, which require a model that is inclined
towards centre-left practices.
Furthermore,  Haarlov  (1997)  opines  that  continental  integration  is  the  only  solution  for  the
eradication of poverty (since in various degrees will share each other’s markets and establish
mechanisms and techniques that will maximize political, social-cultural and economic benefits)
in the continent. As such, he suggests that integration should be the priority of all key actors
within the continent. For continental integration to be meaningful several factors should be taken
into cognizance. Firstly, there is a need to understand the complex process and the relationship
between different sectors that converge for integration to be actualized. The argument is that the
relationship  happens  in  a  two-way  direction,  between  continental  integration  and  the  major
sectors  of  economic  development,  including  infrastructure,  industrialization,  agriculture,
investment, trade (both goods and services), on the one hand, and among these sectors on the
other. For instance, while infrastructure development is an essential component of continental
integration, through physical connectivity, a regional approach to infrastructure development can
substantially reduce infrastructure costs through economies of scale – especially in the energy
sector (Also in The Africa Competitiveness Report 2013).
Several  arguments  have  affirmed  how  vital  continental  integration  is;  however,  regional
cooperation becomes the base of or precipitates continental integration. “Regional cooperation is
when  states  commonly  solve  tasks  and  create  improved  conditions  in  order  to  maximize
economic, political, social, and cultural benefits for each participating country” (Haarlov, 1997).
This  cooperation  while  pertinent  is  sometimes  faced  by challenges  of  colonial  legacies  and
structures. Up until now the boundary-lines from the colonial period remain dominant despite the
intractable problems which they induce (Bach, 1999).
2.4 Challenges of Regional Integration in Africa
There  are  four  main  barriers  that  often  challenge  continental  integration;  they  are  natural,
political, economic and Politico-Economic Barriers (Langhammer & Hiemenz, 1991). In natural
aspect language is a critical barrier. For instance, the colonial divides militate against integration
as the continent is divided between the Anglophone Countries and the Francophone countries
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and the difference is not only that of language but different political systems and structures.  In
Pieterson (2001) examination,  it  is reported that  during cold-war the foreign aids offered by
erstwhile colonial masters, to several African countries, who were intentionally bankrupted by
“them”  for  the  sake  of  permanent  indebtedness,  which  will  automatically  mean the  indirect
control of the affairs of the state in question by the loan or aid provides. This implies that such
countries under such condition,  to some extent cede their  sovereignty as their  government is
influenced by the loan providers. In such instances “they” drive a country’s policies, controlling
its trade and further loot its resources to satisfy “their” unlimited “greedy”.
In concurrence, Bruce Zagaris (1978) provides a comprehensive insight into the entire idea of
The Economic Committee of West African States (ECOWAS) starting from the early 1960s
when states in the West African sub-region resorted to creating a Free Trade Area. The goal of
the initial deliberation before the formation of the regional body was hinged on the idea that once
a smaller block is formed, it can be expanded to include other states in the continent. This was
championed in the 1970s by Nigeria and Togo and finally, ECOWAS was created in May 1975.
The interesting analysis provided by Zagaris remains highly useful considering the challenges
ECOWAS needs to surmount currently. Using four integration models proposed by George C.
Abangwu (1972  and  1974:  116-118)  which  include  “Homogamic  integration  occurs  among
neighbouring  states.  Anabatic  integration  takes  place  among  states  non-neighbouring  but
homologically related by proxy or through a third neighbouring state. Satellite integration takes
place among developed central and peripheral states. Stochastic integration describes a random
residual system of relations among states”.
Abangwu  levels  some  criticism  against  ECOWAS  by  suggesting  that  “current  integration
schemes in the sub-region are based on the conventional concept of free trade area or customs
union,  whereas  the preferable  strategy should be  a  system of  multinational  programming of
investment based on viable economic spaces, functional linkage projects  and development of
transfrontier resource areas”. Arguably, ECOWAS has made remarkable progress in its political
and economic aspects of integration, its trade policy based on the “customs union
Due  to  legacies  and  structure  of  colonialism,  Africa  still  finds  itself  divided,  with  a  lot  of
countries preferring cooperation with their erstwhile colonial masters as opposed to engaging in
cooperation with those they share geographical proximity and similar interest. As a consequence
of colonialism, Africa still finds itself fragmented along different polarities. This fragmentation
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does not allow collective consensus in trade and economic policies to achieve effective bargain
with  the  European  countries  (and  now  European  Union  (EU)).  Nkrumah  initiated  and
campaigned for “integration” as an antidote, to establish better collective economic and trade
platform that could compete globally. Therefore, he pushed for the formation of the OAU as a
way  to  promote  integration  and  continental  unity  in  matters  of  economics,  politics  and
development.  For  Nkrumah,  integration  meant  empowering  African  states  into  a  collective
economic and commercial bloc (unity) within which such integration will fuel growth on the
continent by the force and virtue of economic unity; that cannot be easily manipulated by any
external  force or even internal  pro-Western aligned forces.  It  is  in that  understanding which
spurns the great African liberation pioneers to pursue economic integration, which can enable the
continent to speak with one voice with the global major economic powers. 
Further still, the continent’s economy and development has been unable to flourish because of
unfair trade regulations and imposed economic policies. This has been cited as the consequence
of Africa’s inability to engage with the West as a single unit. Besides, the influence of France in
particular, with un-severed colonial umbilical attachment to former colonies, has become a major
obstacle that prevents the unification and integration of Africa states, since the founding of the
OAU, and it’s subsequently metamorphosis into African Union in 2000. It is important to note
that economic integration at the sub-regional level has recorded some progress in some cases, for
example,  the  Eastern  African  Community  (EAC)  is  one  such  successful  regional  bloc;  and
ECOWAS in West Africa. But most of the sub-regional blocs have their challenges, which, the
case of ECOWAS and SADC which will be explored in-depth in the third chapter of this study
and the implication of that for a continent-wide integration. 
According to Biney (2008: 147), “the prime movers for the reform of the OAU into the AU were
President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa and Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria. The Libyan leader,
Colonel Gaddafi, later joined the motives of these leaders”. Gaddafi had been critical of the slow
pace in the pursuit of African integration wanted many proactive steps towards the conversion of
intentions into action to extirpate colonial divisions that persist. The AU has come under sharp
criticism  as  a  political  talk  shop  for  African  heads  of  state.  What  about  the  sub-regional
platforms too?
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At this juncture, it is positive foresight for Nkrumah seeing that the strength of weaker states
with shared geopolitical and economic commonalities gravitate and upgrade into “regionalism”,1
thus integration is a reliable way to build economies. Nkrumah (1963: 171) argues that 
…enormously greater energy, both human and material,  that would be released
through  continentally  integrated  planning,  productivity  increase  would  be
incomparably  higher  than  the  sum  of  the  individual  growths  which  we  may
anticipate  within  the  individual  countries  under  separatism.  The  cumulative
surpluses  that  must  result  would  achieve  continuing  capital  formations  for
increasing the African investment in expanding development. It is quite obvious
that  integrated  continental  planning  cannot  find  a  substitute  in  the  kind  of
tinkering  that  limits  us  to  inter-territorial  associations  within  customs  unions,
trade agreements, inter-communications services, and the like.
Thus, the splintered way economically weak countries have had to face regions like EU and USA
and blocs in North America, NAFTA, is evidently economic wise overwhelming. Also, the sub-
regional blocs are not an expedient approach the member founding fathers of the OAU insisted
on. Chanda (2010: 21) is of the view that “From the 1960s to date, many integration groupings
have emerged  and faded away in  Africa.  For  example,  earlier  groupings  include  the  Africa
Common Market comprising Algeria, Egypt, Ghana, Guinea, Mali and Morocco in 1962 and the
Equatorial Customs Union composed of Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo and
Gabon in 1962 which eventually  led to the present Central  African Economic and Monitory
Community (CEMAC) and the East Africa Community (EAC) comprising Kenya, Tanzania and
Uganda in 1967 which until its demise was the most developed of all integration experience in
Africa.” Yet the heuristic approach of regionalisation by blocs remains as a preference to achieve
bigger  continental  integration.  The  fact  is  what  have  been  the  results  with  these
experimentations,  and what learning and lessons are emerging from them?  In another report
Rana media reported Gaddafi being critical of the sub-Regional blocs that, 
…those  who  were  promoting  the  regional  blocs  were  acting  to  sabotage  the
federal project and the progress of the continent. …. had been created because
OAU failed and suggested that the regional blocs should be replaced because they
1 Nkrumah, 1963: 165.
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were obstacles on the path of the unity of Africa and created a serious regionalist
danger to the continent.
The report further states Gaddafi citing ECOWAS as dominated by Nigeria and SADC by South
Africa complaint that “these blocs served to create a market in the interest of the big countries
and the submission of the smaller ones, that these countries contributed nothing in the areas of
politics, economy or security.”  So that gives many vents to the research relevance to test the
performances of the selected sub-regions on their integration projects vis-à-vis African Regional
integration.
2.5 A Systems Theory of Regional Integration
According to  Laszlo  & Krippner  (1998:  6-7),  general  systems theory can  be applied  to  test
systems of all kinds from mechanistic structures to organisational ones, “without reducing the
study of psyche to physics, systems theory promises to offer a powerful conceptual approach for
grasping the interrelation of human beings, and the associated cognitive structures and processes
specific to them, in both society and nature”. This thus makes such a theory apropos to this
study.
In Heinonen (2006: 55), views it is submitted that general systems theory has influenced the
conceptualization of the European Union integration championed by German integration experts
such as Ernst Haas and Karl Deutsch among others. Human communities’ traverse periods that
warrant  change beyond the  capacity  of  existing  governmental  jurisdiction  in  closed or  open
segments  of  a  bigger  system.  One of  the  cardinal  explanations  exposed by general  systems
theory, a literary explaining thermodynamic equilibrium of closed and open systems in regard to
how it utilises and generates energy. In this vein, it is needful to shed light on what a system as
applied in this research stand for. Laszlo & Krippner (1998: 7) explanation is of relevance here.
These  authors  posit  that  “the  concept  of  ‘system’  serves  to  identify  those  manifestations  of
natural  phenomena  and  process  that  satisfy  certain  general  conditions.  In  the  broadest
conception,  the  term  connotes  a  complex  of  interacting  components  together  with  the
relationships  among  them that  permit  the  identification  of  a  boundary-maintaining  entity  or
process”.
This clear delineation of the meaning of system enables it to be applied to the human community
or the case of statehood which places itself in situ, the study’s focus. An important elucidation is
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offered by Laszlo & Krippner (2006: 8) as they state that “systems will dissipate energy unless
they are purposively maintained by an outside agency; thus, there must be organizing forces or
relations present which permit the conservation of its structure and function”. The implication
here  is  that  in  a  closed  system,  there  is  no  room to  adapt  and  transform.  Systems  theory
understands that there comes such a time that closed systems can gravitate into internal conflict
if the adaptation does not take place. This can be applied to a widespread of conflicts on the
African  continent,  where  weak  and  barely  economically  passive  states  get  embroiled  in
protracted intra-state conflicts.  This is the reason why adaptation does not happen within the
required  context  or  time  frame.  Ivory  Coast,  Sierra  Leon  and  Liberia  in  West  Africa  are
examples of this. Without the intervention of the Ecowas Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) and
United Nations (UN) interventions, these states could have been destroyed with conflict spilling
to neighbouring countries.
It is also a reality as explained by general systems theory that no system is exempted from its
own limit.  Even stronger stable systems have to evolve, as demanded by growing pressure from
internal structures. In this regard, Laszlo and Krippner (2006: 8) further explain that societies are
natural organic systems and require an upward shift to meet their expanding changes. In this
vein,  the  authors  posit  that  “an  entity  that  does  not  degrade  its  structure  to  thermodynamic
equilibrium but maintains it through the utilization of the energies available in its environment is
a product of the slow but vast processes of evolution in nature. It has emerged in the course of
time, maintains itself in the face of perturbations, and is capable of reorganizing itself to cope
with changing conditions in its environment. Such an entity is a natural system, and includes
individuals and communities”.
A system composes of structures which carries peculiar behaviour as the basis for identity or
distinctiveness.  In  scientific  parlance,  it  is  described  as  emergent  properties.  They  form the
constituents of the system, and emergent properties cannot exercise entity capability on their
own, without constantly being part and parcel of the entire system. Once a stricture is severed or
separated, it is bound to moribund and dies. Accordingly, “structurally, a system is a divisible
whole, but functionally it is an indivisible unity with emergent properties. An emergent property
is  marked  by  the  appearance  of  novel  characteristics  exhibited  on  the  level  of  the  whole
ensemble, but not by the components in isolation” (Laszlo & Krippner, 2006: 10).
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Indeed, we find that the relevance of integration is not like achieving an extended empire of a
particular kingdom state. Most integration ideals, like functionalism and neo-functionalism and
transnationalism,  are  grounded  in  the  collective  force  that  transcends  what  the  nation-state
capability and ability are, to competency and jurisdiction (Heinonen 2006: 54-55). 
In lieu of the need of integration in many global geo-regions, which have relied far long on the
nation-state model and its limited power and jurisdiction; we find the pressure of the people and
society’s needs compelling for zonal integration System theory captures the veracity of such
evolutionary pressure in the view that “these propositions are true in virtue of the fact that in a
universe governed by uniform laws certain sets of relationships are required to conserve and
enhance order over time. Much can be understood of the system's basic properties by assessing
its behaviour in reference to the imperatives of natural system dynamics (Laszlo & Krippner
2006: 10).
Thus, in another way, the contrast will go to assert the woeful Malthusian theory, that, some
populations  at  some point  cannot  transcend its  bound to meets  its  growing needs.  Malthuse
believed that the population of countries can reach levels where their capacity to sustain itself is
impossible. That implies a compulsory reduction is required to address overpopulation or control
rate  of growth artificially.  As much as Malthusian  theory made sense to  some scholars  and
experts,  the  general  systems  theory  debunks  that,  on  grounds  that,  there  is  always  room to
adaption and change for renewal and survival. It is when a system is incapable of change that it
cannot survive. In this vein, human ingenuity empowers them to adaptation as situation demands
by  a  compelling  evolutionary  process.  It  requires  the  integrity  of  leaders  and  managers  to
recognize signs and scenario of pressures and to take the required action to open up a closed
system to vent itself for change. That is described by Mele et al (2010:8) in their conclusion on
general systems theory paper that “managers have to plan structural adjustments to guarantee the
survival  of  the  whole  system,  constantly  formulating  new  interpretations  of  the  business
scenarios in order to find an adequate positioning”.
So, we find the general system theory provides dynamic organisational behaviour measurement,
which is required in reviewing ECOWAS and SADC integration processes thus far; and even
where indicators are not available or blurred within the programme; the theory has facilitated in
gauging  aspects  of  rationale  and  rationality,  designing  methods,  concepts,  structures,
implementations and consonance of processes with impacts to effects. 
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Figure 1: A Systems Theory chart of Integration 
                     
Compelling factors of action within and without the communities have been assessed using the
general  systems  theory  approach  to  set  measurable  frameworks.  The  AU  forms  the  main
supranational  system, with the sub-regions as subsystems in the dissertation as designated in
figure 1. The constituents or emergent properties pertain to the sovereign nation-states which will
capture the framework of institutions and the economic structures that have been reviewed as key
convergence  structures.  The  global  system  is  separated  to  the  background  as  the  supra
international structure which effects and externalities impact the African sub-regional structures
as emergent properties of the continental AU supranational system. But how does that play has
been part of the research?
The relevance of using general systems theory dovetails the Afrocentric approach on African
existential  or  empirical  realities;  as  most  of  the time  Africans  are  not  generally  reductionist
inclined, but have system outlook that can be described as conforming to “irreducibly integrated
systems”.  Community  is  the  integration  of  individuals  who  are  considered  just  emergent
properties of the system that even transcend mere human community to the ecology and space
above (Fu-Kiau (undated). Integration, as understood in the natural African sense, is reality and
wholeness, then fragmented individualistic isolation that underscore the Western sense of statism
as imposed on Africans from colonial era to post-colonial era (Adotevi 1997: 59). That might
have underlain the formation of empires in pre-colonial eras to have a broader human community
of integrated but autonomous groups. Thus,  powerful kingdoms compelled smaller  ones into
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cooperated integration or were forced. This expanded kingdoms into empires but duly different
from European or Western sense of feudal empires.
The problem with general systems is that those with positivist orientation may struggle with the
holistic bases of the theory which is its natural strength, which singles the theory out as firm
ground for broad-spectrum analysis and a gauge of adaptability and synthesis as challenges of
globalization and complexities of human society and existence.  GST may not be of relish to
reductionists  and  positivists  approach  and  outlook  of  things  ontological  or  epistemic  by
dissociation  and  minimization.  Hence,  this  theory  square  with  the  ideals  on  which  Pan-
Africanism was formed to look at broader Africa than fragmented individual states. Also, it will
enable assessing the African regionalism and integration sources of inspiration as introspective
orientation, imposition or cut-and-paste in regard to concepts and theories.
In  addition  to  GST,  Abangwu  (1972  and  1974)  integration  types  (homogametic,  anabatic,
satellite, or stochastic) all of them explained under Zagaris (1978) in literature review subsection
can be helpful to explain the policy rationale and paths to pursue goals set out of that Hence,
Abangwu challenge on the appropriateness of “customs union” other than an approach based on
“multinational programming of investment based on viable economic spaces” is of interest still.
2.6 Conclusion
The chapter commenced with clarification and delineation of terms. In them proceeded to trace
the historical provenance of integration. In its examination of the genesis of regional integration
in the EU, it came to the fore that economic development and mutual prosperity post-WWII was
a chief precursor of integration. In Africa, it was expressed that the need for regional integration
also hinges on the promises such holds for the development of the continent. In exploring some
of the challenges that the continent faces with regards to achieving full integration, legacies of
colonialism, dependency on the West, lack of trust, and the craving for several African states to
be hegemons, are some of the factors that militate against full regional integration. Lastly, the
chapter explored the application of a systems theory and how it explains the need for regional
integration and cooperation.   
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Chapter Three: The Roles of ECOWAS and the SADC in 
Promoting Regional and Continental Stability
3.1 Introduction
This chapter engages in a comparative analysis of the roles ECOWAS and the SADC play as
hegemons in their  respective sub-regions and how this influences the stability of the African
continent.   With  Nigeria  and South Africa being the  strongest  players  in  the subcontinental
bodies, both countries play a hegemonic role at the African Union. By engaging in a comparative
analysis, the chapter seeks to elucidate on the economic and political approach deployed by the
different sub continental organisations and how it promotes both sub and continental stability.
Particular, the chapter looks into how the regional bodies have made use of and propagated the
tenets of democracy in their search for integration and development. 
3.2 The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)
The idea for a regional bloc of Anglo-French West African countries free trade zone (involving
Ivory Coast, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea) originated with President Tubman of Liberia in
1964 (Zagaris 1978:99). By 1967, the regional bloc grew with expanded interest among member
states, with a limited scope – free trade – at its inception. With the efforts of Nigeria and Togo in
1972, a “cohesive and integrated community” (ibid),  with a more expanded role was pushed
forward by finalizing a draft treaty. In 1973, in Accra Ghana, after a legal review of documents,
a  formal  treaty  of  the  Economic  Union  of  West  African  States  was  ratified  and  signed by
member states (Zagaris 1978: 100-101).   To reiterate, the original aim had been to create a bloc
for  economic  integration;  but  the  organisation’s  scope  “expanded  in  the  1990s  to  include
political and security affairs, with ECOWAS becoming the first REC to abandon the norm of
non-interference in its members’ domestic affairs” (Engel and Jouanjean, 2015:8).
Furthermore, ECOWAS went beyond its initial scope of economic integration; the role of the
body further evolved to include pursuing activities and policies that seek to:
 Transform “ECOWAS from an ECOWAS of States to an ECOWAS of People by 2020;”
and 
 Achieve an ECOWAS that shares “single economic space in which its people transact
business and live in dignity and peace under the rule of law and good governance”. (ibid)
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Ensconced in the above two goals are other lists of goals which the organization believes will
enable it to proselytize and attain its objectives as that pertain to the West Africa sub-regional
integration. It is thus important to unpack and assess the ideals of the Treaty’s ideals and
establish the rate of success or lack thereof, of the economic and political integration sought
in  sub-region.  The  chapter  considers  the  following  factors  as  significant  indicators  or
measures of success. They include an interrogation of the propagation of democratic tenets
among the member states, the sense of community and level of cultural communication.
3.2.1 The Instrumental utilization of Democracy for Regional Integration in West 
Africa
Democracy as a system of governance seeks to promote citizens’ role in governance. As it is
widely  known,  it  is  a  government  for  the  people  and  by  the  people  (Teffo,  2004:443).
Mackinder  (1919:237)  describes  democracy  from  the  purview  of  citizen  engagement  and
participation; as he suggests that democracy “demands that every citizen” play an active role in
its processes through voting or calling the government to question. As such, in a democracy, the
role of citizen goes beyond their suffrage right; to also ensuring that government is transparent
and accountable. Patrick Chabal (1998) argues that the presence and structures of democracy in a
country does not guarantee accountability and justice. This has been the case in a preponderance
of African countries, particularly in West Africa. Due to the imposed nature of democracy as a
result of colonialism, Africa still battles with reinventing such a system to meets its governance
challenges.  That  is  to  say,  so  far,  Africa  has  not  found  a  model  of  democracy  that  works
effectively in the continent and for Africans. 
Furthermore, it is said that there are an array of variations in defining democracy. It is a concept
with  controversies,  varied  interpretations  and  praxis.  According  to  Dalton  &  Shin  (2003),
democracy is a political system that, 
…..requires  a  set  of  political  conditions  and  civil  liberties  that  extend  beyond  the
electoral  arena.  These  conditions  are  necessary first  to  ensure  the  meaningfulness  of
elections, and second to ensure that democracy includes more than just elections. If an
election is free, but the society is not, then the election is unlikely to have informed voters
who openly cast their preferences for future government policy. A free election presumes
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a  free  press,  freedom of  speech,  freedom of  assembly,  and  other  political  and  civil
liberties.
Democracy traces its history to the Ancient Greek States, and as such finds its origin in the
Western “culture”. Several Africa scholars, however, tender the argument that democracy as a
practice of societal governance (without multiparty system) existed and have been the manner of
traditional  governance  in  Africa,  where  most  if  not  all  decisions  are  arrived  at  based  on
consensus  in  local  communities  across  Africa  (Nana Nketia  IV,  (undated);  Asumado,  2006;
Teffo,  2004;  Wamala,  2004;  Meer  and  Campbell,  2007).  More  so,  Jonathan  Michael  Sears
(2007)  shows that  “Pre-colonial  West  Africans  [for  example]  were  generally  accustomed to
centralized states with relatively strong bureaucracies and judiciaries, and that provided security
for the population. Although this arrangement was not conflict-free, it  protected trade among
groups within the empires and states, and for long distances beyond”.
The  implication  of  the  above  is  that  political  participation  in  the  form  of  consensus  and
bureaucratic structures existed in Africa. Colonialism however brought with it  a brand of an
authoritarian and exploitative rule. This explains why democratic governance and multi-party
elections post-independence; did (still does in some cases) not change the inherited autocratic
style  prevalent  in  several  West  African  states.  The  violent,  non-consultative  manner  of
governance  wrought  by  colonization  created  a  separation  of  the  state  from the  people  over
generations  (Nketia  V (Undated):  8).  Nana Kobina Nketia  V uses the Ghanaian  state-citizen
dichotomy to portray how the country’s Government servitude to European standards was set
before independence, but his view also paints a clear picture of state-citizen dichotomy across
the  continent.  Why  have  African  Governments  and  people  been  saddled  by  disunity  and
dissension? The plausible answer is that the continent, by and large, has seldom reviewed its
perpetuation of colonial concepts, structures and forms of politics and the overall implication of
that for the development of the continent.
Today,  a  majority  of  Africans  have  to  learn  re-learn  how to  participate  in  governance  and
politics. Arguably, the prevalence and near regular engagement in elections among several west
African countries see to it that government is voted into power. However, after elections, such
governments become sources of partisan divisions. Democracy as a system of government as
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such does not seem capable of tackling Africa’s leadership and governance challenges. Beyond
the electoral process, systems need to be put in place that allows for citizens’ participation and a
platform for interacting with and demanding that elected representatives keep to their process –
essentially, there should be a process or a system beyond elections that allows citizens to demand
accountability.  Additionally,  such  a  system  would  encourage  citizens’  participation  in
policymaking, so as to co-produce and achieve development.  
Elections continue to be the means for selecting political administrators and Government in West
African countries. Against this backdrop, the section further explores the democratic structures
and its benefits peace, security and the overall wellbeing of the people in the sub-region. The
foregoing  is  underscored  by  the  reality  of  the  conflict  that  often  comes  as  a  result  of
democratization,  which  seeks  to  inculcate  and  accommodate  different  cleavages  in  society.
However, a democratic system has been established to be instrumental in handling and resolving
conflicts  that  come  up  from  the  differences  in  society.  Due  to  the  instrumental  value  of
democracy, the system emplaces its self as a mechanism that aids in overcoming barriers that
encourage  divisions.  Through democracy,  more  people  from different  countries,  with shared
values band together to surmount challenges that they alone, are incapable of surmounting.
The  reason  for  the  founding  of  ECOWAS  as  indicated  above  (ECOWAS  of  people  and
integrated economy) was a result of a vision of integration that is hinged on a strong need of
democratization. This speaks to the political goal of integration which we find are well spelt in
the sub-region’s policy document; which articulates the need for structures that are able to handle
conflict  and  ensure  lasting  peace.  Accordingly,  one  of  ECOWAS’  prime  protocol  is  the
Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace-keeping and Security. The
gist  of this protocol is the view that such a structure is key to ensure a democratic  political
climate which will allow the rule of law to thrive, and promote peace, security so as to enhance
development and citizens’ wellbeing within states and across the sub-region (ECA-WA (2015:4;
Terwase, Abdul-Talib & Zengeni, 2015: 260). 
Importantly, conflict prevention goes beyond maintaining order, and peace in the sub-region by
interventions alone. The creation of Electoral Units to monitor member states elections and the
establishment of peace fund are also geared towards contributing to individual state and regional
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stability. As it is reported that “Concerning elections, the Protocol also prescribes a set of rules:
prohibiting any substantial modification of electoral laws in the last six (6) months before the
elections, encourage maintenance of up-to-date and reliable voters‟ lists, elections shall be held
at  fixed  periods,  independent  or  neutral  electoral  commissions,  acceptance  by  all  parties
concerned of election results, election monitoring and ECOWAS assistance (ECA-WA, 2015:
78). This points to a consensus on political  cooperation which is enshrined in the ECOWAS
Charter,  as  a  means  to  achieve  single  political  coordination  and  single  voice  over  political
matters. Such a charter is necessary as the region is one of the areas on the continent, that has
been experiencing a near regular occurrence and eruptions of armed political conflicts, and all of
them are internecine conflicts. 
The effectiveness of the body thus far is evidenced in the role the collective political mandate of
ECOWAS has  been  used  to  diffuse  conflicts,  provide  all  kinds  of  interventions  in  conflict
situations,  which is  made possible  by an understanding that  conflict  in  one member state  is
conflict in all of them. For instance, ECOWAS played an instrument effort, in the transition from
power of former President Yayah Jammey of Gambia.  In order to avoid a military solution,
ECOWAS with support from Gambians made way for the ousting of Jammey, after his electoral
defeat.  ECOWAS  has  intervened  in  Mali,2 Niger  and  did  a  lot  in  collaboration  with  the
international community to prevent Ivory Coast from relapse into war in 2010 when Gbagbo
refused to relinquish power in electoral defeat. Furthermore, another intervention was made in
Guinea to prevent  a military coup from entrenching itself  as government  (by suspension)  to
ensure democracy prevails in the most legitimate manner for peace in the sub-region. As most of
the  intra-state  conflicts  relate  to  governance  issues  in  particular,  the  promotion  of  good
governance and democracy in the individual state for stability and peace could outflow to all
parts  of the region much of it  benefitting the civilian community in the region. The case of
Liberia and Sierra Leone are examples of the use of the military intervention in the region.
Democracy is thus a sine qua non for development and regional integration as the preceding
paragraph underscores. According ECDPM background paper, there is link between democracy
and development  as “it  has proven difficult  to  establish a direct  causal  relationship  between
democracy and development,  a broad international consensus has emerged on the potentially
2 These drag on the Malian intervention by ECOWAS revealed weakness in response capabilities at that time (ECA-
WA 2015: 101).
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positive  role  democracy  –or  ‘democratic  governance’-  can  play  in  development  processes,
particularly in the long run (ECDPM, 2009: 2). Implicitly, instability as a result of politically
motivated conflicts undermine development by destabilizing communities and their livelihoods;
in addition to the carnage and the destruction of property and life.  Such conflicts  also cause
refugee problems. With victims of war, fleeing to countries in other parts of the region with a
more stable situation and this cause a strain both on refugees and their host countries. 
The recourse to functional integration was to utilize it instrumental as policy to ensure extended
democracy  and  its  shared  value  for  peace  and  ensure  development.  As  such,  in  order  for
democracy to serve its purpose as instrumental for peace and development, it is required that it
should be the foundation for integration – one which is citizen-centred. The effort of ECOWAS
in promoting democracy is not only necessary for the sub-region; but it points to the fact that
under such an umbrella, good governance can be emplaced, security and development are an
attendant  result  of  such.  The  European  example  is  strong  evidence  of  how  the  pursuit  of
integration if broadened in scope, could serve as a conflict prevention mechanism and instrument
for development in peace.
3.2.2 Structural Value of Democracy 
The sustenance and strengthening of democracy is another challenge which requires appropriate
structures to promote long term sustainable development. The evidence across Africa is that of
weak states with ailing economies; and this has to bear on the level of poverty, inequality and
underdevelopment in such countries. The structural value of development comes out clear in the
ECDPM (2009: 4) paper that:
There is no solid empirical base for the view that various ‘preconditions’ need to be in place for
democracy  to  emerge.  Yet  structural  factors,  including  low levels  of  human,  economic  and
institutional development, may seriously hamper the prospects of consolidating and sustaining
democracies.  Hence  the  need  to  invest  in  the  foundations  underpinning  democracy  (e.g.
education, citizen awareness on rights, employment, human security)…. Legitimate, capable and
effective state institutions are key to promoting both the democracy and development agenda.
This  implies  the  need  to  properly  articulate  strategies  respectively  aimed  at  strengthening
democracy, development and state-building.
Some of the mechanism put in place by ECOWAS like the ECOWAS Parliament, and other sub-
regional organisation like The Council of the Wise among others, have served in compelling
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other member states to make efforts in meeting integration standards. For example in the area of
human development, societies in West Africa have improved female enrollment in schools. This
is an affirmation of growth and awareness in the women’s abilities and efforts to promote gender
equality.  So,  according  to  ECA-WA  2015  report  on  ECOWAS  integration  progress,  much
progress has been achieved in closing the gender gap in education.  “Guinea and Benin have
almost  reached  parity  in  primary  education,  while  Togo  and  Senegal  are  progressing
satisfactorily, followed by Burkina Faso and Mali”. However, the report expressed “disturbing”
concerns about the overall population of female from basic education, to secondary and tertiary
levels in all fifteen countries. The concern raised is that “In the area of higher education, it has
been observed that the enrolment  rate in Sub-Saharan Africa is the lowest in the world.  For
example, the highest enrolment rate was recorded by Cabo Verde with 18%, followed by Ghana
with 12%. Niger’s rates are the lowest (2%). However, the establishment of centres of excellence
has made great strides in the sub-region” (ECA-WA, 2015: 74)
The above underscores the low levels of education and as such, human capacity among women.
This is a problem because the majority of the population in those countries are females. An array
of studies has established a link between female education and its role in contributing to the
overall  development  of  a  country.  Evidently,  there  is  a  clear  correlation  between  economic
growth and women economic  empowerment.  Chung et  al  (2013) argue that  “…with women
representing  one-half  of  human capital,  limiting  the ability  of women to contribute  impedes
economic  growth in  local  and regional  markets  and macroeconomic  levels.  A study of  sub-
Saharan African and East Asian countries shows gender inequality accounts for 15 to 20 percent
of differences in cross-national economic growth performance”.
It has been difficult to pinpoint the persisting cause of the low levels of education among females
in the sub-region, as it  is reported that  most of them only have basic education.  This trend,
however,  needs  to  be  addressed  because  if  the  body  is  to  be  an  ECOWAS of  people  that
propagates  the  tenets  of  democracy;  female  education  is  necessary  to  make  them  active
participants in the economic and political process of their countries. As the ECDPM (2009: 6)
paper further elucidates that “experience clearly demonstrates the critical  importance of well-
informed and active citizens in promoting both democratisation and sustainable development.
Yet  in  many countries,  a  wide range of  barriers  need to  be overcome to  fully  mobilise  the
potential of citizens to claim their rights and demand accountability”.
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The  acknowledgement  and  expression  of  human  rights  are  hard  if  functional  societies  and
communities have such low levels of female education. Certainly, it undermines democracy and
hampers the simple demonstration of human rights of mother and child. At this stage, it can be
inferred that such a travesty is tantamount to the human rights violation. Accordingly, the role of
effective  public  policies  come  to  the  fore  as  an  important  strategy  needed  to  enhance  the
performance of the state and society in the context of inclusivity, equality and equity.
3.2.3 Language, Culture and Communication 
The linguistic aspect, in this case, surrounds not the indigenous language but the official colonial
languages.  Division  in  the  continent  has  been  by  and  large  achieved  by  the  imposition  of
European languages as an official political and business language. Engel & Jouanjean (2015: 8)
citing  Metzger  (2008,  p  25)  point  out  that,  “in  terms  of  other  contextual  dimensions,  some
authors have pointed to the significance of the different French, British and Portuguese colonial
and in turn linguistic traditions in the region. These have fomented what has described as “the
well-known antagonism between English-speaking and French-speaking West Africa”. 
Indeed,  the  political  discord  that  existed  in  the  region,  particularly  among  in  Francophone
countries, was based on how France controlled it former colonies making it difficult to enter into
political  and  in  some  cases  economic  cooperation  with  its  neighbours  who  are  non-French
speaking. However, through the role of Nigeria as a hegemon in the sub-region, the integration
agenda was given a thrust. Consequently, ECOWAS has successfully embraced all states in the
sub-region irrespective of linguistic backgrounds and surmounted the neo-colonial walls which
separated  them.  Such an achievement,  in  particular,  has  made ECOWAS a success  story of
effective political integration, and a stellar example for other regions to learn from. For instance,
ECOWAS enjoys the free movement of persons of member states to live, school, work and do
business anywhere in  the sub-region.  ECOWAS is  known to be well  ahead of all  the other
regions and the system works relatively well, although there some implementation difficulties
observed sometimes, especially for those in cross border trade (Ogunfolu, 2009: 21-22).
3.3 Southern Africa Development Community (SADC)
3.3.1 SADC Integration
This  section  will  look  at  the  SADC integration  process  by  interrogating  if  the  process  and
dynamics  of  the  integration  could  serve  as  a  precedent  for  a  broader  vision  of  continental
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integration.  Odén (1996: 48) raised concern over a theoretical  model  that  could describe the
SADC integration. The author suggests that in that vacuum “an eclectic analytical approach will
be  necessary"  because  she  finds  “southern  Africa  will  not  develop  along  just  one  of  the
suggested models.”  Other scholars contend that SADC integration appears to be “much closer to
a  traditional  intergovernmental  organisation”  (Heinenon,  2006:  156).  Some  other  scholars
suggest that the style of regionalism is akin to the neoliberal model.  According to a SADC
dossier,  “all  countries in the region believe in market-oriented economic policies”; and as a
response to  harmonization  policy  members  “have liberalized  their  economies,  brought  down
budget  deficits,  liberalized  exchange  controls  and  considerably  improved  overall  macro-
economic  fundamentals”  (Arya  & Snoeks,   2005:  30).   In  line  with  neoliberal  explanation,
Hettne defines new regionalism in the following way:
The new regionalism can be defined as a multidimensional process of regional integration
which includes economic, political, social and cultural aspects. It is a package rather than
a single policy, whether concerned with economics or foreign policy. The concept thus
goes beyond the free trade market idea, i.e. the interlinking of several previously more or
less secluded national markets into one functional economic unit.  Rather, the political
ambition  of  creating  territorial  identity  and  regional  coherence  is  the  primary
neomercantilist  goal.  In  this  observation,  other  differences  between  old  and  new
regionalism are implied. New regionalism is spontaneous and from below, whereas the
old type often was imposed on a group of countries in the interest of superpower strategy.
Thus,  the  new  regionalism  belongs  to  a  new  global  situation  characterized  by
multipolarism. (Hettne 1999b in Hettne and Inotai 1994:15 quoted in Oden, 1996: 9-10)
It is of import to highlight that the SADC exhibit these macroeconomic characteristics caused by
donor pressure and South Africa’s influence as a regional hegemon. Yet the SADC defies the
very definition of neo-regionalism in its  entirety.  It  is  opined that the SADC has a complex
struggle with “path dependency” issues. That  is to say that in order for the SADC to enjoy
positive  transformation,  it  needs  to  meet  the  increasing  socio-economic  human development
needs of its people (Kapinga, 2015: 50). In so doing, the SADC integration could achieve its
aims and objectives. Despite a not fitting into a particular theoretical model of integration, the
Organization  still  maintain  a vision of (i)  Creation  of a Free Trade Area and (ii)  promoting
political, social, and Cultural Cooperation (Ndulo 1999: 13). As the SADC Treaty states that the
major objectives of the regional integration scheme will include the following:
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● Evolution of common political values, systems and institutions;
● Promotion of peace and security; and
● Strengthening and consolidation of long-standing historical, social and cultural affinities
and links among the peoples of the region. (Matlosa (undated: 16)
Again,  in comparison to  other  countries  in  the continent,  countries  in  the SADC sub-region
gained their independence later than other African states, Albuquerque & Wiklund (2015: 1) as
such describe the region as that in which the “levels of human development in the region are
higher than in the rest of sub-Saharan Africa, income inequality within southern African states is
among the highest in the world. Despite cultural,  language and ethnic differences across (and
within)  SADC member  states,  the majority  share significant  historical  commonalities”.  Still,
Maasdorp & Whiteside (1992a:44-5) describe the region as  “the most developed country in
Africa,  i.e.  South  Africa,  a  long-standing  economic  integration  and  monetary  arrangement
(SACU plus CMA) with a sophisticated financial infrastructure; a reasonable industrial structure
in Zimbabwe; significant untapped potential  in the energy sector; and significant unexploited
resources in Angola and Mozambique. It is a region which also seems to have forged a feeling of
common identity thanks to the various economic groupings in existence”.
The potentials in the region can best be harnessed with effective and appropriate integration.
According  to  Motlosa  (undated:  39)  “conflicts  of  various  forms  mark  the  region’s  political
landscape,  especially  violent  conflicts  in  DRC and  Lesotho’  instability”.  The  persistence  of
violent conflicts in some SADC states is thus another hurdle to integration. To achieve effective
integration would require ample measure of peace and partial surrender of sovereignty. These are
required to facilitate the centralization of powers to the autonomous SADC (Heinenon, 2015:
154).  Moreso,  political  asymmetry  in  SADC remains  another  key  aspect  required  to  hasten
integration. The reason as Heinenon (2006: 157) points out is that “the main responsibility for
the achievement of the objectives of the integration seems to be given to the member states”.
3.3.2 The Instrumental Value of Democracy and Elections in the SADC Region
SADC, like many other AU sub-regions, has its share of conflicts, from liberation wars to other
civil conflicts like those in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Angola, Lesotho and Northern
Mozambique. The DRC, in particular, remains a critical situation. Recently, the SADC had to
play a role in ensuring peaceful conduct of elections and transfer of power in the DRC. Other
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successes recorded in the sub-region includes its instrumental role in post-election Zambia and
Tanzania. There are however some criticisms levelled against the SADC; particular the handling
of the 2008 Zimbabwe elections. On that note, SADC mediation between the ZANU and MDC
led by Thabo Mbeki, SADC critic Cawthra (2010: 30) states that the “SADC was seen in the
early stages of the crisis as acting as if the Zimbabwean liberation struggle was still underway.
Solidarity was the keyword, and public statements against the government of Zimbabwe were
not made”.
A similar criticism is levelled against the SADC in Madagascar where a 2009 coup replaced
president  Marc  Ravalomanana  with  Andry  Rajoelina  (Albuquerque  &  Wiklund  2015:  2).
According to Matlosa, “It could be argued, therefore, that the major problem facing the region is
not so much that there are conflicts (overt and covert, violent and non-violent) everywhere, but
rather that no effective regional mechanisms have been built for constructive management of the
conflicts. In lieu of such criticisms, the SADC has revived its instituted Guidelines and Principles
for governing democratic Elections in the sub-region. In spite of the foregoing, the Organisation
has been fingered for “focusing too much on election day procedures and for alleged rubber-
stamping of contested election results”.
Furthermore, the Organisations long-standing “principle of not intervening in domestic affairs, a
principle  stemming  from  a  deep  sense  of  loyalty  among  member  states  due  to  their  joint
liberation movement legacy” has weakened its actions of intervention in member states when
early warning signs point to a need for speedy action. Essentially, the body still maintains its
policy of non-interference; until necessary. There is thus the implication that the SADC approach
on  integration  is  cautiously  being  pursued  unlike  some  other  sub-regions  and  demands  the
Organisation standing by its principles. Some of the critics fail to understand that there is the
political dimension to the integration, which even in some advanced and maturing integration
like the EU face such challenges. Integration is not a consummated merger per se, but a partial
arrangement for broader convenience in the greater interest of the citizenry. In spite of that, the
political  sovereignty  of  the constituting  state  in  the  process  must  be  respected  to  encourage
gradual  evolution  and  gravitation  of  members  toward  integration.  Also  within  SADC  as
Albuquerque & Wiklund (2015: 3) observed, “the extent  to which democratic  principles  are
upheld varies considerably across member states. SADC’s commitment to democratic practices
is  explicit  in  guiding  documents  such as  the  SADC Treaty  and the  organisation’s  Strategic
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Indicative Plan for the Organ. Nevertheless, SADC strategies for achieving democracy mainly
focus on achieving and upholding electoral standards in the region”.
Again,  the sub-regional organisation has an Organ for Politics,  Defence and Security,  that is
responsible for promoting peace and security in the region (Albuquerque & Wiklund (2015).
This instrument is subordinate to the Summit of Heads of States of SADC, the supreme policy-
making institution of the organisation. As Albuquerque and Wiklund (2015: 2) see it, “the Organ
has  little  opportunity  to  direct  policy  and largely  acts  as  an  administrative  tool.  The Organ
reports to its chair, a head of state, a position that rotates annually and is managed by a troika of
the  incoming,  current  and outgoing  chair.  Much  of  the  work  and direction  of  the  Organ is
dictated by the interests of the current chair, resulting in little continuity in its work”.
Despite some of these political shortcomings in implementations and actions, SADC commands
respect on the continent for its regional early warning system, a regional peacekeeping centre
and the SADC Standby Force. The latter is “regarded as one of the most mature of the regional
standby forces which are intended to make up a fully operational African Standby Force from
2016. The Organ also has election monitoring and mediation capacities, including the recently
established  Mediation  Support  Unit  and  a  Panel  of  Elders  to  act  as  SADC  mediators”
(Albuquerque & Wiklund, 2015: 4). The Standby Force with its 3000 troops and later increases
have been of value in the UN-mandated DRC Peacekeeping Operation from the onset  when
Kabila’s  government  rejected  International  Conference  of  the  Great  Lakes  Region (ICGLR)
member states (Rwanda and Uganda) on its territory.
3.3.3 Governance and Development: The Structural Value of Democracy
In  order  to  achieve  its  aim and  objectives  of  integration,  the  sub-regional  Organisation  has
established some institutions to express and carry out their mandates. These are the Summit of
the  Heads  of  State  or  Government;  the  Council  of  Ministers;  Commissions;  the  Standing
Committee of Officials; the Secretariat and the Tribunal (Ndulo 1999: 16). However, the SADC
operates on the basis of a highly decentralized structure which contradicts and defy most of the
integration concepts. We find that its sectoral programs are based on areas of cooperation, and
are  coordinated  by a  specific  member  state  as  may be decided by the  Summit.  The current
allocations of responsibilities to individual countries are as follows: Angola-energy; Botswana –
livestock  production  and  disease  control;  Lesotho-soil  and  water  conservation  and  land
utilization;  Malawi-fisheries,  forestry  and wildlife;  Mauritius  tourism;  Mozambique-transport
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and communications; Swaziland-manpower development;  Tanzania -industry; Zambia-mining;
Zimbabwe-food  security  and  overall  coordination;  and  South  Africa-trade  and  investment
(Ndulo, 1999: 17). 
In 2005 SADC document on its Twenty-five years of Achievement, it is stated that “the powers
and  capacity  of  regional  decision-making,  coordinating  and  executing  bodies  have  been
strengthened and legally binding instruments, the SADC Protocols have been developed,” an
indication of some gradual evolution to enforce compliance to formulated Protocols (Arya &
Snoeks, 2005: 30). This reinforces the allegation that the SADC’s struggle is underscored by its
theoretical  uncertainties.  Hence,  the  democratic  structures  which  encompass  various
development programmes and projects have partly suffered. This is further compounded by the
Organisation’s failure to back clear end-vision with ideology guided by appropriate  theories.
Consequently,  “harmonization”  and attempt  at  convergence  may face  political  hurdle  as  the
developmental structure is not conceptually organized, because of the tug of war between the
past and pressing issues for radical transformation and action in the region. The SADC’s massive
colonial  inheritances  were  not  designed  to  suit  the  once  excluded  majority  of  the  region’s
citizens.  So SADC’s struggles need adaptations  and further require  political  and institutional
transformation (Kapinga 2015: 50).
With regards to gender issues, the SADC continues to make progress on addressing gender-based
violence and other similar gender-based issues; especially in the area of children and women
trafficking.  The  various  countries  have  harmonized  their  interception  strategy  through
compliance with immigration Protocols. The other gender matters of violence against women
and children or the vulnerable groups have also attracted a sub-regional level campaign with
special activities designated in various countries to educate the community members. The fact
that such SADC projects depend on donors is not practical; because naturally, donors have their
preference and choices to projects which could clash with some cultural practices and concepts.
For example, the Zulu and Swazi practice of testing the virginity of young maidens has received
criticism; a criticism that is based on a wrong perception the donors have about the annual event.
The same donor funds have not actually helped to achieve responsible attention to other projects
and initiatives as Vanheukelom & Bertelsmann-Scott (2016: 12) report, “while donors provide
support  for  both  SADC gender-related  projects  and  institution  building  these  initiatives  are
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insufficiently  translated  into  action  on  the  ground  by  state  and  non-state  actors  or  gender
champions on the ground”.
SADC’s policy on gender allows Non-Governmental Organisation (NGOs) to take the
leading role, and the aim is to encourage citizen participation in addressing such micro-
level challenges.  That is can be described as a good approach to SADC’s regional policy
and  institutional  frameworks.  However,  the  problem  of  effectiveness  of  NGOs  as
reported above is worrying; especially on how matters of accountability. There is also a
confusion  of  roles  and this  has  been cited  as  a  major  loophole  that  militates  against
accountability  and  transparency.  Söderbaum  (2004:  122,  125)  called  for  NGOs  to
transcend national borders into collective regional force which can be feasible depending
on motive and credibility to the social course and not political expediency.
Arguably, gender issues remain a considerable challenge in spite of efforts made within
national and regional legislative instruments. Vanheukelom & Bertelsmann-Scott (2016:
12) found that “in every aspect, the challenges on the gender front remain daunting with
widespread poverty, increasing incidence of gender-based violence against women and
girls,  immense burden of HIV and AIDS, and emerging crises such as trafficking of
women and girls” (Cited from SADC, 2005: p. iii).
It is also necessary that issues of poverty and inequality should be addressed; as they
have been affirmed to be the main drivers in gender-based violence and violence against
women and the girl  child.  There  is  thus  a  need for  coordination  within  the different
structures  of SADC. Effective  coordination  and communication  between the different
arms and structures of the SADC can lead to full integration and the attainment of the
developmental  benefits  of the body. Such efforts  are also likely to set standards or a
benchmark of what level of gender equality, social welfare and economic development
required of member states. 
Another way to understand the issue of gender is to also consider it from the perspective
of  security.  Like  in  West  Africa,  women  form  a  greater  part  of  the  sub-region’s
population and developmental  target as well.  Hence,  ensuring the security  (protection
from violence, abuse etc) of women should enable the SADC to achieve some of its aims
and objectives 
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3.3.4 Language and Culture
SADC has a similar eclectic linguistic challenge like ECOWAS but it has not posed as a political
hurdle because the Anglo-phones are the majority with only one Franco-phone (DRC) and two
Lusophones (Angola and Mozambique).
Concern over “public order” in member states of integration community has been pointed out as
an issue by Sundkvist (2009: 28). This is important because, beyond the difference in language,
the sub-region also shares a commonality of a history of subjugation, racism and generally a past
history of colonial dehumanization. This has led to the instrumental use of different Truth and
Reconciliation Commissions. Significant efforts have been made to overcome the racial cleavage
in the body as this is seen as important precedence to public order in the sub-region. 
Sundkvist (2009) suggests that public order has become relevant in thinking about what attribute
would constitute a SADC cultural issue in this sub-section. Most integration authors are silent on
these  matters  and  only  focus  on  political  and  economic  factors  that  may  militate  against
integration.  The  issue  of  ‘afrophobic’  violence  in  South  Africa  from  2008  and  subsequent
recurrence with the last one happening in 2019 has raised an international outcry, and SADC
member countries whose citizens were much affected questioned the violence’s consequence for
SADC. The reason is that such violence happens in the most powerful SADC state, South Africa.
The Government of South African has assured SADC and AU that they will take preemptive
measures to forestall any such recurrence and nip them in the bud. 
The various structures and SADC Protocols do not address the issue of SADC identity. This,
however,  could be a useful  instrument  to galvanize  its  multi-racial  population.  Racial  issues
remain a significant factor in South Africa with issues relating to colonial racial injustice and
human rights violations persist. Namibia is also demanding massive reparation from Germany
for the Herero genocide.  The land expropriation in Zimbabwe which resulted in violence on
white farmers drew Western sanctions against it, and similar land matters and racially charged
issue also exist in South Africa. SADC Protocols have been silent on the crucial role of race and
culture in the process of integration. 
3.4 Summary of chapter
The chapter looked at how political and social sectors of in ECOWAS and SADC have been
deployed  to  achieve  integration.  The  chapter  underscores  each  sub-region’s  strengths  and
46
weaknesses in their quest for integration. Studies on each sub-region have been critical about
issues like poverty, inequality,  the rights of women, inter alia. Political  expediency has been
described as an obstacle  to  the progress of integration  in the two reviewed sub-regions.  For
example,  Albuquerque and Wiklund (2015) describe the integration  process  of the two sub-
regions by suggesting that “ECOWAS, SADC appears to be more of a forum where regional
leaders coordinate policy, rather than an institution with a partly autonomous function”. Such a
remark depends on one’s position and point of view. As a caveat, it is not within the scope of this
chapter  to  pass  critical  judgment  by  comparing  the  two  sub-regions;  the  chapter,  however,
underscores some difference between the two regions. For instance, this chapter affirms the fact
that ECOWAS leaders are more proactive in their zeal towards integration (ECA-WA 2015: 15).
This  is  in  sharp  contrast  to  the  apparent  laissez-faire  attitude  of  leaders  in  SADC towards
integration. The pace of ECOWAS’ political convergence despite prevailing spates of conflicts is
commendable. In achieving its objective of uniting the citizens in the sub-region, efforts have
been expended on easing policies that could hamper such a goal. 
The  SADC side  has  divergent  context  and  peculiarity  that  has  put  political  gaming  at  the
forefront. The idolization of a liberation mindset precludes the sub-regional body from address
pertinent  issues  faced  by  their  citizens.  The  SADC’s  potential  to  achieve  much  through
integration could be as compared to other regions in Africa, but the study shows much of the
sloppy pace of integration is as a result of a fear of ceding sovereignty to a supranational body.
So the pace to  convergence has  not  to  be enhanced by the highly  decentralised  system and
structures  of  the  SADC.  More  so,  a  lack  of  unifying  ideology  or  a  lack  of  theoretical
underpinning to sub-regional integration in the SADC was also critiqued. Also, SADC has failed
to address the issue of race and culture. Some member states are still facing challenges that are
racial in nature. Borrowing from J.H. Mackinder (1919: 328), “home politics must be conducted
with an eye to their  effect on foreign politics,  a truism in the superficial  sense,  but carrying
deeper  implications  than  is  commonly  admitted.”  SADC  can  envisage  a  real  sub-regional
integration, but some issues still remain, and this will be explored by reviewing other factors
which are cardinal to integration in subsequent chapters.
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Chapter Four: Legal Framework and Governance Processes for Integration
4.1 Introduction
This chapter  analyses the legal and governance framework that underpins the functioning of
ECOWAS and SADC. The aim is to understand how these frameworks facilitate integration. The
first section of the chapter looks at aspects of the legal and governance regime of ECOWAS, and
how the two facilitate its mandate and an effective integration process. Precisely, ECOWAS is
the  sub-region  that  has  driven  deeper  into  the  process  of  integration.  This  is  visible  in  the
strength of the organization as a supranational power; as it  has extended its initial  economic
integration objectives to embrace a political integration too
4.2 ECOWAS’ Legal FrameWork
After  a  review of its  1993 Treaty,  ECOWAS set  up Community  sectoral  policies  within its
different structures (ECA-WA 2015: 16). The pace and progress of integration in the sub-region
are commendable. Additionally, there has been remarkable growth and achievement due to the
implementation of such legal frameworks and other treaties and policies that seek to promote
cooperation at all levels in the union. According to ECA-WA (2015: 16),
Several  initiatives  undertaken  after  the  establishment  of  ECOWAS  have  helped  to
strengthen  its  institutional  architecture  and  to  deepen  its  common  policies,  thereby
generating significant achievements in the sub-regional integration process. Signed on 24
July  1993  in  Cotonou,  the  revised  Treaty  goes  well  beyond  economic  matters:
establishing  cooperation  notably  in  the  political  and  security  domains,  granting  the
Community powers to sanction, which demonstrates the desire to make ECOWAS an
active player in international law in Africa and worldwide.
Some important institutions and structures within ECOWAS that remained within the 1975 treaty
include the Authority of Heads of State and Government, the Council of Ministers, the Executive
Secretariat  and Specialised Technical  Commissions.  With the ratification  of the 1993 Treaty
came the addition of four (4) new institutions into the organization. They are: (i) The Community
Parliament;  (ii)  The  Economic  and  Social  Council  (which  is  yet  to  be  set  up);  (iii)  The
Community Court of Justice, which replaces the Community Tribunal in the initial Treaty; (iv)
The  Fund for  Co-operation,  Compensation  and  Development,  which  was  established  by the
initial Treaty, did not hold the status of a Community Institution. A status that was bequeathed to
it by the 1993 Treaty (ECA-WA, 2015: 16).
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The  ECOWAS Community  Court  of  Justice  took  just  over  ten  years  (1991  –  2002)  to  be
established and fully functional. The Community Court signified a very significant move on the
part  of  ECOWAS  to  strengthen  regional  integration  by  ensuring  “cooperation  in  legal  and
judicial  matters for the proper functioning of the processes and institutions,  and the eventual
attainment of the goals, of integration in the Community” (Alabi, 2013: 28, 29). In spite of the
appreciation of the Justice component within the ECOWAS legal framework, there exists the
need for much work to go on to achieve not just a structure; the content of the structure matters
as  much.  In that  vein Alabi  (2013:  29)  reports  that  “ECOWAS judicature  in  the integration
process has been generally absent or at best, superficial, lacking any depth of scholarly analysis
expected of a court of such potentially immense regional/international significance”. Essentially,
in  order  for  ECOWAS to  achieve  full  integration,  it  requires  a  strong and  functional  legal
institution that holds the power to persecute and have its mandate of bringing justice exercise
with diligence. 
Furthermore, ECOWAS has made tremendous progress and undergone significant evolution. For
instance,  ECOWAS’ evolution  from just  an  economic  union  to  a  political  one.  In  order  to
achieve such, there are legal issues that needed to be clarified. One of such legal issues is the
near ceding of a state’s sovereignty to a supranational organization. In the UNECA-ECOWAS
report (undated: 14) describes that as the voluntary legal request of the “Economic Union of
West  Africa,  requires  some degree of transfer  of  sovereignty  “to the Community  within the
context of a collective political will”. Furthermore in the ECA-WA (2015: 16), ECOWAS 2007
evolution was commended as it is stated that,
in 2007, building on 32 years of the Community's existence, the Authority of Heads of State and
Government  decided  to  transform  the  Executive  Secretariat  into  a  Commission,  with  larger
prerogatives and leeway for more active role in the integration process. In accordance with this
structural change, the Commission, headed by a President and assisted by a Vice-President, also
comprises seven (7) Commissioners who head the seven Departments which correspond to the
activity sectors of the Community. In 2013, the Commission was restructured, with the number of
Commissioners increasing from 9 (including the President and the Vice-President) to 15; thus
each Member State has one Commissioner.
Under that arrangement or framework, ECA-WA (2015: 16) submits that “from a legal point of
view, progress will be considered as community law becomes directly applicable in the territory
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of Member States, in respect of the following Community Acts: (i) Supplementary Acts passed
by the Authority of Heads of State and Government; (ii) Regulations, Directives, Decisions and
Recommendations passed by the Council of Ministers”.
The effectiveness  of  any act  or  law is  its  execution,  and ECOWAS has  been successful  in
executing some of its acts  and laws. A case in point,  the organization has been proactive in
managing the conflicts that are faced by member countries. In situations where a mandate is
required,  they  have  been  quick  with  execution.  During  the  Third  Ordinary  Session  of  the
Authority of Heads of State and Government held in January 2008 in Ouagadougou, ECOWAS
was able  to  pass  a  supplementary  Act  A/SA4/01/08  to  adopt  the  Emergency  Power  Supply
Security Plan (EPSSP) which required securing a location in some member states with “Free
Zone Status.” The powers are invoked under the jurisdiction of ECOWAS Acts and Decision
therein embedded.
Again,  Alabi  (2013:  96)  cautions  that  “in  the  circumstances,  legal  instrument  for  regional
integration schemes are haphazardly drawn and remain inadequate in giving regional institutions
and processes that could readily position them to play leading role, in contradistinction to State
power,  in  defining  the  course  and  pattern  of  regional  integration  schemes”.  The  foregoing
cautions for a need for such legal frameworks to be clear so as to ensure that the process of
integration provides and expand opportunities; harness resources on the broader scale, so as to
enable  the  organization  to  solve  challenges  faced by member  states.  Essentially,  integration
remains an inevitable model to transcend developmental challenges in West Africa. Adequate
and  a  functional  legal  system  is  required  to  ensure  that  the  developmental  issues  facing
ECOWAS such as conflict and underdevelopment can be adequately addressed.
4.2.1 Governance
Governance is concerned with control; by engaging in the provisions of law and structures that
ensure the distributions of resources through legitimate political  institutions in a state or at a
supranational level. The issue of Governance in an integrated sub-regional community can be
complicated; particularly the fact that such governance framework requires a partial ceding of
individual states’ sovereignty. Again, governance also involves political methods, administrative
structures,  tools,  process and inclusion of Civil  Society Organisations (CSOs) among others.
These  instruments  of  democratization  have  been  extensively  implemented  in  the  process  of
integration in ECOWAS. 
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The Governance role in the sub-region takes on a broader framework which is illustrated below.
Table  1.  below  shows  the  processes,  treaties  and  protocols  that  seek  to  create  an  efficient
governance  structure  for  ECOWAS since  1991 with  the  promulgation  of  the  Declaration  of
Political Principles. In the case of governing free movement, the rationale is the understanding
that “the three protocols ask member states to take all legislative and other measures necessary
for their implementation.  However, it should be noted that the immigration admissions laws in
ECOWAS member states have supremacy over the ECOWAS protocols” (Hartmann 2013: 13;
also Garcia and Seron 2014: 27).
Table 1. The Framework of Governance Transfer by ECOWAS (Source: Hartmann (2013: 
13)
Year Title HumanRights
Democra
cy
Rule of
Law
Good
Governa
nce
1975 Treaty of ECOWAS (Lagos)
1979
Protocol  Relating  to  Free
Movement
(X)
1991
Declaration  of  Political
Principles
X X
1993
Revised  Treaty  of  ECOWAS
(Cotonou)
X X
1999
Protocol  Relating  to  the
Mechanism
for Conflict Prevention
X X X X
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2001
Protocol  on  Democracy  and
Good
Governance
X X X X
2001
Protocol on the Fight against
Corruption
X X
2008
ECOWAS Conflict Prevention
Framework
X X X X
The revision of the ECOWAS Treaty in Cotonou in 1993 gained momentum with collective
interventions in conflict resolutions and prevention, and the enforcement of Good Governance
from 2001 which required a centralized authority. Good Governance principles sought to enforce
a credible electoral process, a violence-free election and a Protocol that seeks to address the issue
of corruption in the sub-region. Arguably, corruption still sands the wheel of development and it
is often linked to violence and civil conflict in the sub-region. Hartmann (2013: 13) points out
that in “a press statement by the ECOWAS Commission from 12 June 2012, of the 53 protocols
and conventions adopted since the establishment of ECOWAS in 1975, 38 had entered into force
by 30 April 2012 while 15 still awaited ratification”. 
Another unique aspect of ECOWAS is the political will which is conducive for creating Africa’s
functional integrated sub-region. The evidence shown by such a commitment as reported that
“the  various  member  countries  of  ECOWAS,  through  acts  and  decisions  passed  during
Conferences of Heads of State and Government and at ministerial meetings, have continually
reaffirmed their attachment to deepening regional integration and their total ownership of the
regional integration project in West Africa” (ECA-WA 2015: 15).
The effort made by ECOWAS leaders has been to consolidate democracy which in its best form
and authenticity  can mitigate  political-related violence,  and ensure stability  in the region for
growth and development. Membership into ECOWAS was not by prescribed criteria but a form
of inclusion by choice. In the case of Mauritania for instance, the country was admitted willingly
and was also allowed to withdraw to join the Arab Maghreb region. The pledge to ensuring
democracy has been proven by a concerted effort  by ECOWAS leaders in their  readiness to
collectively  act  together  to  intervene  and  restore  stability  to  member  states  as  discussed  in
chapter two. According to Hartmann (2017: 94), “there is certainly a strong variation among
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African sub-region when it comes to the number of democratic regimes. This would explain why
ECOWAS finds it easier than other regional arrangements in Africa to push for democratisation,
and why it is less likely that we will see a repetition of ECOWAS’s restoration of democracy
policy in other parts of the African continent” (Hartmann 2016).
The process of integration in West Africa has faced some challenges, particularly those related to
governance; as several of its leaders have manipulated democracy to achieve self-entrenchment.
For example, the cases of Paul Biya of Cameroon, and such acts limit the democratic outlook of
the  sub-regional  organization.  There  is  thus  a  need  to  improve  democratic  practices  among
member states so as to deepen the effects of integration. As such, ECOWAS still has much work
on further strengthening and building the capacity of the ECOWAS Commission to enhance its
effectiveness in terms of proselytizing the tenets of democracy. 
In  that  vein,  some  of  the  programmes  by  the  Organisation  have  been  strengthening
neighbourliness  through  special  organs.  These  Organs  enable  visibility and  presence  of  the
Organisation  as  it  approaches  a  fully-fledged  regional  Government.  Some  activities  include
monitoring in “countries  through National  Coordinating Committees  and National  Units,  and
sometimes  by  special  representatives  (appointed  to  countries  in  conflict  and  post-conflict
situations,  ECOWAS has chosen not to have Permanent Delegations  in Member States).  All
these structures contribute to strengthening the sense of community in member countries” (ECA-
WA, 2015: 15).
4.2.2 ECOWAS Parliament
The ECOWAS Parliament has been another Organ of governance created without overt powers,
but perhaps a heuristic structure to initiate its gradual graduation into a fully-fledged Parliament
of ECOWAS Union. Its function currently has been to serve to link ECOWAS citizens to the
regional Coordinating body. The ‘Strategic Plan of the ECOWAS Parliament, Third Legislature,’
2011-2015, p. 22) describes the purpose of the ECOAWS Parliament:
To promote the participation of West African citizens through democratic representation
in the cooperation and integration process leading to the establishment of an economic
union  in  order  to  raise  the  standard  of  living  of  the  people  and  increase  economic
stability, foster relations between member states and contribute to the advancement and
development of the sub-region.
The Parliament jurisdiction, if in the future is conferred will enable it by to diversify its functions
in much legislative manner, to enhance regional democracy, rule of law and promotion of peace
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in the region. The ECOWAS Parliament currently has no legal binding on the overall activities
of ECOWAS and as such, it will not be explored in this work but this study acknowledges it
exists as a structure under the ambit of ECOWAS. 
4.3 Challenges to Integration in ECOWAS 
There  are  several  challenges  that  face  ECOWAS’  effort  towards  achieving  full  regional
integration.  Some  of  these  challenges  are  legal  in  nature  and  others relate  to  governance.
Particularly the issue of ceding sovereignty. In an erstwhile study conducted by Garcia & Seron
(2014: 28) it is reported that in some cases of integration, some member states are reluctant to
“relinquish their sovereignty in certain areas.” That has remained setback to the pace of some
integration processes and rollout of activities to hasten convergence of ECOWAS. Garcia and
Seron’s  (2014) further  point  out  that  ECOWAS’ inadequacies  “in  terms  of  institutional  and
organizational capacity and circulation of information flow – both internally and externally –
have limited its achievements in the integration process”. The Report further notes that the “lack
of technical capacity, the insufficient human resources, the slow pace and inadequacy of internal
procedures  make  it  harder  and  delay  decision  implementation  and,  therefore,  hinder  the
development of different regional strategies.”
Another critical factor pointed out  by Garcia & Seron (2014: 29) is that the “hindrance of the
regional  integration  process  is  the  existence  of  several  regional  organizations  with  the same
mandate  and competencies.”  The Report  raises  the  “case  of  the  WAEMU/UEMOA (with  a
historical and cultural French influence) and the ECOWAS (led by Nigeria, an English-speaking
country) is a paradigmatic one” and that has on the sideline generated “tensions, overlaps and
cases of lack of convergence between both organizations have been numerous and they persist to
this day, despite significant progress.” The Report further bared the role of the former colonial
interest  and  allegiance  as  “geopolitical  and economic  interests  of  the  two European powers
linked to each of the organizations (France and the UK) do not foster univocal processes of
regional integration and nothing indicates that this situation is going to change any time soon.”
This  Pandora  box  is  opened  as  what  the  future  hold  as  a  challenge  for  the  supraregional
integration of the AU. The saying unity in diversity is what Africa leaders and their states need to
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rethink if the interest of continent moving forward is something important.  The next section will
consider the legal and governance structures of the Southern African Development Community.
Another challenge facing regional integration in Africa is the fact that given the colonial history
of African countries, after independence they relied heavily on western countries for many things
such  funding,  political  system,  and  economy.  This  has  created  a  situation  whereby  African
leaders find it difficult to govern their countries because of the conditions that were attached to
financial  assistance  (in  the  form  of  loans)  that  was  given  to  African  countries  during
independence. This has further caused some serious concerns in relation to the sovereignty of
these African countries. According to Gumede (2019) “African leaders realized the need to take
African matters  into their  own hands for  the continent  to  progress  and not  end up in  chaos
completely”. 
4.4 Southern African Development Community (SADC)
 SADC approach  to  integration  as  discussed  in  Chapter  three  points  to  an  unruly  political
background with deeper political fissures. According to van Nieuwkerk (2012: 37), “the region is
characterised  by powerful  as  well  as  weak forms of  governance,  ranging from state  failure,
contested  election  outcomes,  and  non-democracies  to  robust  and  successful  modern
democracies.”  The  shadow of  former  colonial  policies  still  prevails  in  structures  which  are
supposed to have transformed to ensure the states and sub-region self-assertion is driven to serve
the  development  needs  of  the  region.  This  review  covers  how  unique  SADC  economic
integration in regard to its legal system and governance.
4.4.1 SADC Legal Powers and Structures
The guiding  principles  for  the  SADC legal  system are  articulated  in  the  SADC Treaty  and
ratified  protocols  of  1992;  a  transition  from mere  memorandum of  understanding of  former
SADCC to a Treaty. The Treaty defines a protocol as “an instrument of implementation of this
Treaty,  having  the  same  legal  force  as  this  Treaty”  (Amended  SADC  Treaty,  Article  1)
(Heinenon, 2006: 160). The procedure for decision-making is by unanimous consensus by the
Summit. All members are supposed to be present for decisions to be made and each has the right
to veto as an expression guaranteed by the full sovereignty rights enshrined under the SADC
Treaty. Heinenon (2006: 161) further explains that,
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The two most  important  decision-making competencies  of  the  Summit  are  related  to
amending the SADC Treaty and approving new Protocols. Interestingly, in the case of
amending the Treaty, the Summit uses majority decision-making (three-quarters), while
in  approving  protocols  the  general  rule  of  consensus  is  followed.  The  Council  of
Ministers also makes decisions on a basis of consensus (Amended SADC Treaty, Article
11:6). The Council of Ministers is responsible for overseeing the functioning of SADC
and implementation of SADC policies.
Matlosa (1999) also suggests that “independent Southern African states have simply inherited
these systems from the colonial rulers together with other constitutional frameworks.” These are
legal, governance and electoral system that replicate the different patterns of colonial systems in
each country; such legacies makes it difficult for there to be a political consensus required in
regional  integration  (Kapinga  2015:  50).  For  example,  compared  to  other  regional  IGOs in
Africa, much of SADC political hassles remain largely an issue of internal party bickering and
strong liberationist  ideology that  needs  to  be transformed into a  developmental  agenda.  The
apparent lack of democracy in some post-liberation parties is a hindrance to cohesion which is
underlined by differences in ideology. This delays the processes of transition and transformation
into rooted full integration that is sustainable politically and economically. As argued by van
Nieuwkerk (2012: 37), “this transition has also been accompanied by some relative opening up
within parties to allow some modicum of intra-party democracy although serious challenges still
remain  if  the  commendable  beginnings  of  the  democratic  transitions  are  to  trickle  down to
parties. These challenges revolve mainly around (a) party leadership, (b) primary elections, (c)
party funding, (d) gender equity, and (e) management of the internal affairs of parties”.
South Africa, Zimbabwe, Zambia among others have seen the Africa National Congress (ANC),
ZANU-PF and near the brink of collapse in 2017, as internal ideological contestation and control
of power have brought about a shunning of developmental ideas. The issue of legitimacy is not
inter-party democratic contestation but intra-party divisions caused by post-liberation and post-
independence undefined ideological path. The consequence of such has had an impact on the
overall reorganization of the regional bloc (Muritala, 2018). As the SADC sub-region still dwells
in the challenges of post-liberation instead of reconstruction. This reconstruction should take the
form of  regional  integration  as the effects  of  harm and damages caused by colonialism and
coloniality  in  political  and  development  sense  require  collective  and  united  policies  and
programmes to deal efficiently with such challenges.
The legalities normally assume political overtone as integration deepens, as the EU could not
avoid incorporating political integration, and evident in the ECOWAS process too. And it can be
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seen that in the case of SADC, the apparent aversion to political integration is itself hindering the
unfolding of  full-blown economic  convergence  as  expected  by this  period.  Furthermore,  the
legalities  will  require  certain  concessions  and  technicalities  which  the  political  unreadiness,
unfettered  sovereignty,  and  economic  disparity  as  many  of  the  SADC  states  have  weak
economies has been an issue of frustration to SADC integration. But the advantage which some
of the liberationist minded conservative politicians failed to acknowledge, are lessons from other
integration and blocs successes. 
The SADC has  attempted  tourism convergence  which centres  on Transfrontier  Conservation
Area (TFCA) on wildlife conservation and environmental protection as stipulated by the Protocol
on  Wildlife  Conservation  and  Law  Enforcement  of  1999  (Southern  African  Development
Community:  Regional  Indicative  Strategic  Development  Plan,  (undated):  39,  68,  148).  The
SADC has also made attempts to strengthen the following: agriculture, energy, water, tourism,
construction, financial, mining, fisheries, transportation and communication sectors. The goal is
to achieve appropriate relocation of production arrangement could make the sub-region achieve
commendable economic growth and ameliorate poverty and unemployment among young people
(Kapinga, 2015: 64; Tanyanyiwa & Hakuna, 2014: 110; Hartzenberg, 2012: 18f; Söderbaum,
2004: 142). Some of these opportunities have been held back by the pockets of instability and
conflicts  in  countries  with  rich  resource  potential  like  the  DRC,  Lesotho  and  Northern
Mozambique. The conflict in DR Congo remains a major factor that the SADC has been unable
to take decisive action on. The conflict has polarized the region as questioned the legitimacy and
the efficiency of the SADC as a sub-regional bloc. 
A posteriori, issues of political legitimacy remain sensitive in the sub-region with some member
states like Swaziland and until the recent forced retirement of Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe; as
still  affronted  with  issues  of  democratic  accountability.  In  the  case  of  ECOWAS,  the
organization  took a  trajectory  that  sought  to  deepen  integration,  by  aggressively  pursuing a
political  and  economic  integration  approach  that  seeks  to  ensure  its  democratic  stance  on
political legitimacy in the region. Any of the member state that does not comply stand the chance
of punitive measures. Also in 2013, we saw how the regional bloc intervened in Guinea, Mali
and Niger. That is not the case in SADC though there is the Protocol and talk about democracy.
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SADC does not command such authority despite its Protocol of Peace and Security, because of
the indecisive stance on political integration, and if anything at all it is just laisser-faire. Heineon
(2006: 157) in his criticism of the SADC Treaty points out that, it, “remains silent on the actual
authority and powers of the organisation in this task and just states that the SADC shall among
other things, for example, the attempt to harmonise policies (Amended SADC Treaty, Article
5:2).
Political legitimacy that enhances economic integration has been lacking in SADC. And experts
believe  several  factors  can  be  drawn  to  explain  the  weak  front  of  SADC  among  others.
According to Misty (2000: 558):
The failure of African governments to translate their commitments in regional treaties
and  agreements  into  substantive  changes  in  national  policies,  legislation,  rules,  and
regulations.  There  was  no  follow-through  in  translating  regional  commitments  into
national actions;  The unwillingness of African governments to subordinate immediate
national political interests in order to achieve long-term regional economic goals or to
cede  essential  elements  of  sovereignty  to  regional  institutions,  and  An  absence  of
monitoring and enforcement mechanisms to ensure adherence to agreed timetables on
such matters as tariff and NTB reductions or in achieving more difficult objectives.3
The argument, as several other authors have pointed is the role of old political actors who were
disinterested in regionalization; and focused on the power they enjoy as head of states makes it
difficult to make them fit into the big picture. It is unfortunate because historically, most of these
old political actors are liberationist, and they acted together as a region to enlarge their power
and capacity to fight colonialism. It is somehow unthinkable that the same crops of leaders are
averse to doing the same on the economic façade at a sub-region level. The foregoing weakens
the  legitimacy  of  SADC  as  an  economic  bloc  and  further  points  to  its  weak  governance
structures. What then are the issues of SADC governance and how does the governance structure
shape the way for continental integration?
4.4.2 Governance in the SADC Sub Regional Bloc
SADC has been observed to have weak institutions; and such a weakness has been described to
spur from the despotic manner of governance, a colonial  inheritance.  Scholars agree that the
effort of SADC integration even at an economic level has been frustrated by a lack of common
values which seem to create an environment of distrust and uncertainties, even after the post-cold
War era. According to Nathan (2002: 78), “SADC integration, especially in the field of ‘high
politics’, is difficult since countries are divided into two grounds. In their domestic policies, they
3 Non-trade barriers - NTB
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have been divided into democratic and authoritarian countries; in foreign policies, member states
can be divided into militarist and pacific countries” (Cited in Heinenon, 2006: 188).
That  has  entrenched  the  sense  of  protectionist  attitude  in  the  form  of  strict  adherence  to
sovereignty,  even  if  that  undermines  developmental  progress.  Hence  evidence  available  in
literature proves that much of slow pace of SADC towards its preferred economic integration is
due to a high level of political and institutional unwillingness caused by the context background.
Thus, the broader interest of the sub-region and its people’s development have been subjected to
political  myopia, in the guise of defending of sovereign rights, but that of individual narrow
personal  agenda.  Such  example  is  the  issue  that  has  saddled  the  DRC  with  instability  as
sovereignty itself becomes personal entrenchment of leader and regime. And as the governance
of the region is affected by instability in one member state, the need for cooperation that limits
internal sovereignty is essential for necessary political interventions, where human rights matters
by excessive political control occur. Hence, instead of SADC wielding that authority as supra-
state  Organ  Heinenon  (2015:  162)  argues  that  “SADC  member  states  have  pooled  their
sovereignties  in  the  areas  of  cooperation  to  the  supranational  level  and use  them nowadays
together. But…they have even more effective mechanisms to protect their national interests ...”
That means within the legal structures of SADC and its Secretariat the Treaty permits a state
ability to veto majority consensus where its preferred or national interest is not served. Yet, what
constitutes national interest most of the time may be just the narrow interest of political elites as
the case of Zimbabwe and Madagascar. Despite widespread democracy over the years in the sub-
region, the political machinery and governance structures used to serve political entities interests
have not yet ended in SADC. Mugabe was coerced to resign or be impeached by his own Party
when excesses of his personality cult attempted to impose a dynastic succession via his wife,
Grace.  In Lesotho the serial  murder of political  and military leaders remain unanswered and
vigilance  over  its  fragile  politics  after  intervention  by  South  Africa  and  SADC.  Lesotho
development remains deplorable and its citizens have sojourned in South Africa on arranged
conditions as SADC free movement of people is far limited.
The nature of SADC states politics with the exception of South Africa continues to weaken their
governance institutions. There is still excessive dominant liberation Parties with some states like
Zimbabwe,  Swaziland,  Mozambique,  Namibia  remaining  almost  like  a  one-Party  state.  The
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institutional arrangement does not augur for the political climate which can transform the politics
and  the  economy,  as  expected  to  manage  development  matters  to  benefit  ordinary  citizens.
Kapinda (2015: 49) explains the scenario that, “the application of Historical Institutionalism (HI)
in  SADC  can  be  explained  by  considering  the  historical  evolution  of  institutions  through
informal  (the way things are generally  done) and formal (laws, rule sets) interaction and by
examining their establishment, performance and change over time…”.
A key concept of Historical Institutionalism is path dependence. It explains the persistence rather
than the change of institutional arrangement. In advancing the Historical Institutionalism model
to  explain  some of  the  entrenched  institutional  patterns  that  are  not  conducive  for  effective
political and economic development, Kapinda’s concern has been the prevalent lack of reforms
and stereotypes that  do not  only undermine national  development  but  frustrates  the effort  at
SADC’s economic integration. For instance, Tanyanyiwa & Hakuna (2014: 110) have argued
that,
SADC has failed to achieve its goals of deepening regional integration SADC region has
the  potential  to  bring  more  arable  land  under  cultivation  and  to  start  using  modern
irrigation systems that could reduce dependence on rain-fed agriculture. At present, less
than 20% of arable land in SADC is under cultivation, and only 10% of available water is
used  for  irrigation.  The  hydro-electric  potential  in  SADC  is  estimated  at  well  over
142,000 megawatts per year, and the region is exploiting only 7% of this potential.
This resourcefulness of agriculture and hydro-electric potential among others can be unleashed
by proper deeper and reliable integration arrangement as many of SADC states are poor. The
development of SADC rich agriculture potentials will improve the overall economy of the sub-
region in attracting value-adding processing investments. It is the nature of SADC laisser-faire
inducing  structural  arrangements  and legalities  which  have  hamper  progress  towards  deeper
integration, and that kind of arrangement as discussed above pertains to HI. So who protects the
HI and how it is done?
Kapinga (2015: 50) further argues that the constraint on SADC progress can also be attributed to
what Pierson (1996:131-142) describe as “path dependency,” a situation which locks institutions
and organisation on an irrevocable course because of ossified positions and ingrained ideologies
or old practices as “lock-in.” In that case, change becomes imperative but is resisted in favour of
the status quo politically. In the case of SADC, the prevailing presence of old liberation actors
and legacies  have ossified into shrines and personality  cult,  which makes addressing present
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geopolitical  and economic challenges an issue of allegiance to Historical Institution.  Kapinga
(2015: 50) posits,
As the liberation movement legacy is a potential risk for the political development within
the member  states,  it  also constitutes  an asset  for  influence and mediation.  The FLS
credibility and respect for liberation elders still carry a lot of weight. The fact that SADC
structures are built on the legacy of the FLS4also influences the organisation negatively as
it places potential constraints on the political manoeuvring in the region (Cited from Hull
and Derblon 2009:12).
The Frontline States and the liberation Organisations acted as structures within the region. The
purposes have been clear, to take over the political decision-making and economic ones into the
hands of the indigenous people. The underlying factor has been to achieve development for their
countries and provide proper governance that enhances the freedom and dignity of the people.
And like Nkrumah pointed out, if the independence of one state cannot be sufficient for that
state’s development and actual freedom, then it must join hands with others to pursue that. So in
Nkrumah’s conception of development that is sustainable to address the effects of colonization
and drive African continent onto equality status with the rest of the world would require not just
ideological parlance but practical integration of the continent. As much as Nkrumah’s foresight
differs with many of the leaders of the emerged liberated states, his notion of change having to
take shape in a system than just structures to enable sustaining that change, has been what faces
not just the sub-regions of the continent but the entirety of the Africa Union.
Integration of any sub-region is not just a dream to be pursued but normally arises from what
integration  theories  posit  as  meeting  human  development  needs,  that  transcend  the  existing
capacity  of  the  individual  states.  In  the  case  of  politically  and economically  weak states,  it
becomes  inevitable  and  imperative  to  tackle  developmental  challenges  from  such  system
approach which means integration of states into bigger substructure, or where applicable into a
regional system. Such change does not happen by Officials appending their signatures on print
documents, but it takes substantive legal procedures to grant and warrant authority to centralized
bodies  mandated  to  coordinate  integration  cooperation,  giving  it  powers  wielded  to  bind
respective  members  within  the  integration  space  to  comply.  The  case  of  EU has  been  well
4 Frontline states - FLS
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emphasised as the most excellent example which transcends economic integration to political.
The example of well functional economic integration is the Association of the South-East Asian
Nations (ASEAN) encompassing Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Philippines and Thailand. The
pledge to that integration was without political one, but the countries have committed themselves
in  the  fairness  of  sovereignty  and  yet  joining  their  economic  policies  to  create  such  an
association  which  serve  to  enhance  trade  within  the  bloc  among  themselves  and give  them
leverage  in  external  trade  agreements  with  China  and  the  West.  It  has  served  to  improve
production and the gains amount to achieving a substantial increase in intra-ASEAN trade which
currently stands at around 25% (Ko, 2013; quoted in Tanyanyiwa & Hakuna, 2014: 108)
Resistance to change is symptomatic of inorganic structures. In that case, any organic structure
or system must subject itself to change as demanded by internal changes or external pressures it
cannot avoid. Even the fight for liberation have resulted after internal condition within colonized
states  reached  their  tipping  point  compelling  rollout  of  demand  for  independence  after  the
Second World-War. In the same manner, political theories particularly capitalism and Marxism
will tell that human societies grow and expand in material needs and such adjustments come by
the  political  response to  demand for  reforms or  transformation.  In  that  vein,  we find astute
leaders are quick to observe the temperature of their state in regard to limit for change and take
advantage to lead it.  It is contradictory that as much as SADC countries are in the throes of
poverty and pressures of globalisation, the leaders have stuck to moribund ideas of bush warfare,
instead  of  seeing  the  need  to  re-craft  their  states  to  embrace  the  need  for  change  for
developmental transformation.
What Kapinga (2015: 49) goes on to say in providing some clues to the resistance to change or
persistence by institutions, for example, SADC is as follows:
There are three factors that account for the persistence of institutions or policies over
time. Firstly, the resistance of supranational actors to institutional change such as policies
in favour  of  more member  state  control.  Secondly,  Pierson  (1996:143)  observes  that
institutions are often ‘sticky’ and therefore ‘specifically designed to hinder the process of
institutional and policy reform’. Thirdly, Pierson (1996:144) points to the role of sunk
costs and the rising price of exit, stating that “individual and organisational adaptations to
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previous  decisions  may  also  generate  massive  sunk  costs  that  make  policy  reversal
unattractive”.
Taking these three-prong factors into consideration, SADC fit into all on the ground that the
Organisation faces AU pressures to reforms in alignment with its supranational transformation;
its member states conflicting ideological stances and sometimes paternalistic allegiance; and the
cost  involved in  some drastic  reforms with  many  member  states  already in  severe  financial
doldrums makes it difficult  to expect much as theoretically or conceptually is required, even
practically as demand by the needs within the broader context. However, true as SADC has come
under consistent firing from scholars and experts alike, for its laisser-faire approach with the
economic integration; indeed, SADC has undertaken some reforms and restructuring which gave
the impression of serious attempt to yield to the pressure of the developmental needs. That, in
fact, gave more powers to the SADC Secretariat in the implementation of the SADC policies and
decisions. The reform of the Amended Treaty requires that:
…the Secretariat is responsible for the implementation of decisions of, for example, the
Summit,  the  Organ  on  Politics,  Defence  and  Security  Co-operation  and  the  Council
(Amended SADC Treaty, Article 14:1). However, on a national level, each member state
should establish a SADC national committee. This national committee should also assist
in the implementation of the SADC policies, for example, coordinate and oversee the
implementation of SADC programmes of action (Amended SADC treaty, Article 16A:4)
(Heinenon, 2006: 162) 
By enhancing  the  authority  of  the  Secretariat  goes  with  the  ability  to  recommend sanctions
against recalcitrant state or entities therein that trespass or undermine SADC principles (SADC
Treaty,  Article  33:  2).  And such sanctions  are  not  prescribed  by the  Secretariat  but  by  the
Summit depending on the merit or demerit of the case on its own grounds. Heinenon (2006: 142)
articulates that generally among all the IGOs and sub-blocs:
Absence of monitoring and enforcement mechanisms' on the regional level effectively
explains why governments have been able to slip from their regional commitments. The
secretariats of regional organisations have been weak…There has not been a party that
would have promoted the regional interest or overseen that regional commitments are
effectively  turned  into  national  policies,  as  …  a  necessary  condition  for  successful
integration.
That betrays the oversight of governance and renders the institution incapable to deal with lapses
of  members  as  naturally  expected.  In  the  case  of  SADC,  the  positioning  of  permanent
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representative  teams  in  member  states  has  that  observer  mission,  unlike  the  ECOWAS one
whose mission is non-permanence. The status of such representation depends on the model of
integration and aims and that is clearly demarcated in how SADC coordinate its activities in
member states whose sovereignty remain highly unfettered. 
4.5 Challenges to Integration in the SADC Regional Bloc
Tanyanyiwa & Hakuna (2014; 113) have raised a number of criticism and challenges and those
that fall under the topics under discussion are selected. The authors find these SADC flaws and
weaknesses in regard to legalities and governance:
There  is  a  lack  of  power  for  the  SADC Secretariat  as  the  Central  Executive  Organ  of  the
Organisation. According to Tanyanyiwa & Kakuna, “It is primarily an administrative body with
no formal political power.” That impedes the progress of the Organisation as most of its planned
implementations remain at standstill over years unattended, and required reforms are most of the
time frustrated with the inability of the Secretariat to take action as they would want to.
The excessive reliance of the SADC on external  donors to sponsor its activities  is  a glaring
weakness. It ends up rendering the Organisation vulnerable to compromises of “legitimacy” that
do not serve the needs of the region and its poor people well. 
SADC has come under repeated and wide criticism for its slow pace and sometimes no action.
Tanyanyiwa & Hakuna (2014; 113) further observed that “Despite the ambitious goals of the
SADC sectoral initiatives,  progress made to date has been somewhat limited and it has been
widely acknowledged that there is a lack of mechanisms for evaluating and monitoring projects
or assessing their effectiveness. Moreover, there is a concern that the organization is still more of
a political bloc than a true instrument for regional economic integration.” They do restrain their
harshness saying “SADC has a disjointed and fractured structure which gives too much power to
Heads of  State.  This  means  the implementation  of  key policies  often  does  not  happen.  The
Secretariat, as SADC’s implementing arm, lacks capacity and the authority to enforce decisions
and is not empowered to engage in independent diplomatic action to address conflict situations.
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Conflict resolution processes rely on Heads of State and government and ministerial committees,
both of which are invariably committed elsewhere in their political and domestic roles.”
Finally, though not the end Tanyanyiwa & Hakuna (2014; 113) find SADC wanting for “lack of
synergy  between  the  objectives  of  the  Treaty  on  the  one  hand  and  the  existing  SADC
[Programme of Action] and institutional framework on the other, and finally lack of appropriate
mechanisms  capable  of  translating  the  high  degree  of  political  commitment  into  concrete
programmes of community building and integration.”
To belabour these criticisms further on would end up bleeding the Organisation that remains
unabashed by its  critics to zoom into the action of reforms, because of the problem of path
dependency and lock-in. SADC commitment to changing the sub-region defies the integrity of
change theories that the inner pressing issues are enough to warrant effective reforms. Without
reforms  that  are  radical  and  drastic  in  consonance  with  the  current  sub-region  growth  of
challenges and needs, will not make the institution relevant to socio-economic demands. It will
mean SADC has been unable to deliver by its own merit and standards. However, the level of
criticisms is no misnomer, but indicative of the confidence that people want to place in SADC to
gear  up into action.  That  is  possible  by adherence  and commitment  to  radical  change.  That
requires the overage leaders and politicians of SADC to leave the shadows of the war era and
move into the world as it is now; the pressing heat of globalisation and how the Community can
use the advantage of effective economic integration as its preference to fetch the region’s share
of the global free-market economy façade. 
4.6 Summary of chapter
In summary, Chapter three reviews aspects of the ECOWAS and SADC Integration framework
on legal and governance instruments as Protocols. Both contexts have made their own varied
progress pertaining to the kind of integration model being pursued. At the same time, both sides
have serious shortcomings to deal with in regard to legal and governance instruments. Within
ECOWAS the combined economic and political integration has been daunting exercise taking
into  consideration  the  Official  bilingual  differences  splitting  the  region  mainly  along
Anglophone and Francophone blocs. Hence, the achievement of a near merger of these states
into a single sub-regional union is significant at the height ECOWAS has attained, especially, the
formation of the Community Court of Justice, which requires further development to make it
competent to deal with predictable tougher cases. The other commendable has been the focus on
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the sub-region’s people or region’s member states citizens “circulation” (Garcia & Seron 2014:
27).  The region has introduced ECOWAS Passport  to enhance free movement of ECOWAS
citizens, though, not without its shortcoming around uninformed immigration Officials and how
sometimes traders and migrants are harassed at the border with financial extortions (Garcia &
Seron 2014:  27).  The height  of  ECOWAS integration  is  the  achievement  of  member  states
ceding  to  limiting  their  internal  sovereignty  towards  the  consolidation  of  the  ECOWAS
Commission as the future Governing Organ in the region. The ECOWAS context has to depend
on its kind of integration to surmount frequent violent political conflicts that have rocked the
region for decades and the issues of poverty, unemployment and health problems.
On SADC, the Chapter found its progress lies in progress made at reforming SADC Treaty and
introducing new Protocols to facilitate its economic integration as its main focus. As such much
of SADC integration activities have been attempt macro-level convergence which has by and
large been slow by the guaranteed level  of sovereignty enjoyed by member states.  Hence,  a
single member, despite its consensus-building approach to decision-making can veto proceedings
if the direction does not favour its national interest. SADC has much inflexible approach to many
political issues, with its FLS ideologies serving more divisive than uniting the region with less
Official  linguistic challenges.  The issue of Liberation Historical Institutionalism and interests
around liberation political cults with their influences that demand compliance to the status quo in
most cases are a hindrance to needed reforms in the sub-region and the economic integration.
SADC potential  to  vibrant  economic  integration  is  huge,  but  the  laisser-faire  manner  of  the
integration over decades has drawn much criticism to the entire SADC integration edifice than
commendations. The level of poverty and economic constraints by weak economies of many of
the member states yet sit on natural resources and high young populations requires more than
just  economic  integration  for  the  region  to  surmount  its  gaping  underdevelopment  human
conditions.
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CHAPTER FIVE: Economic Integration and Level of Intra-Regional Trade and
Investments
5.1 Introduction 
The  Chapter  reviews  the  economies  of  ECOWAS  and  SADC.  Collins  Dictionary  defines
economy as “the system according to which the money, industry, and trade of a country are
organized” (Collins Dictionary).5 The chapter covers issues of convergence and harmonization of
integration  policies  of  ECOWAS  and  SADC  member  states  on  economic  status,  trade
liberalisation,  monetary  union,  investments  and  human  resource  development.  The  two sub-
regions as part of the bigger Africa region share in the range of endowments distributed across
the continent. Africa is endowed with varied natural resources than the four other continents. The
continent has an array of common and rare mineral resources, crude oil reserves, arable land and
water bodies. Besides all that, the continent is known to have the most vibrant youth population.
In spite of all these endowments, the continent development lagged behind other continents in
deplorable ways.  The standard of living of the majority of the average people on the continent is
generally indecent and abject poverty as an economic and political matter. 
Some experts go much far to describe the situation of developmental retrogression on the greater
part of the continent as underdevelopment (Zambakari 2012: 174; Chang 2009: 11, 13). By this
term,  the implication is  that  the range of the economy - trade and investments  -  depend on
external  interventions,  without  which  possibly  Africans  are  unsustainable  financially  and
economically. Indeed, the majority of the economies of countries in Africa are not sustainable
without  external  grants  and  donor  supports.  The  notion  now  is  that  Africans  trade  mainly
externally and minimal intra-continental trading, with “less than 12% and 10% for African and
ECOWAS trade respectively;6” and that has affected economic performance and growth on the
continent. Ndulo (1999: 6) has observed that “the greatest single barrier to trade in Africa is lack
of production and infrastructure.” 
Integration  theorists  have  the  view that  to  achieve  effective  integration  all  members  joining
hands in such economic and political cooperation or union should achieve some level of growth,
as principles of economics would require. In addition, the cooperating states must harmonize
5 Collins Dictionary: https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/economy
6 Source: REASSESSING THE MARKET INTEGRATION APPROACH TO AFRICAN 
INTEGRATION: EVIDENCE FROM THE ECOWAS FREE MOVEMENT PROTOCOL 
African Economic Conference: ‘Regional Integration in Africa’ October 28-30, 2013, 
Johannesburg, South Africa. Available at:
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trade policies, investment policies and achieve monetary union.  In the two sub-regions being
reviewed, the similarity is that both have one country that stands out as dominant economically.
ECOWAS has Nigeria and SADC has South Africa. In view of that the chapter will, therefore,
answer  the  question,  how  can  states  of  weak  economies  achieve  economic  and  political
integration that can stimulate their ailing economies to grow? What can stall such a possibility is
of interest too. There is a special focus on the role of the dominant economies in the two sub-
regions.  The chapter goes to examine issues of economic changes, especially  in the areas of
economic, trade and monetary convergence of the two sub-regions that can impact the broader
AU  integration.  Hulse  (2016)  work  on  “Regional  Powers  and  Leadership  in  Regional
Institutions”  that  propound  Regional  Power  Behavior  concepts  and  applied  to  the  dominant
powerhouses of ECOWAS (Nigeria) and SADC (South Africa) have been used to analyze the
integrity of underlying factors and rationale of the economic powers in two sub-regions.
Hulse  (2016:  12ff)  framework  that  is  essential  here  consist  of  Power  Concerns;  Functional
Efficiency Concerns; Legitimacy and Signaling Concerns; and Neopatrimonial Concerns. These
concepts helped to explain the role of dominant regional state’s economic and political interests,
in regard to pursuing integration and how that affects the process dynamics. They also help to
explain the nature of change dynamics by providing the core value answers pertaining to interest
and origin of such interests. Are they systemic or localized inspired interests? The rationales are
determined by how such interests play out in behaviours and compulsive approach to influence
or  dialogues  pursuits.   Hence,  the  method  emerging  from that  considered  the  rationality  of
factors; two, the practicality of factors; and three, the reality of factors.
5.2 Integration’s Economic and Trade Rationality in ECOWAS
The economic aspect of the ECOWAS sub-region as discussed in previous chapters formed the
most prior factor calling for the formation of the ECOWAS sub-region. Some experts believe
that  the pivotal  position of the Heads of States and the structure of ECOWAS gives it  easy
authority to influence economic policy in the sub-region of West Africa (Hartmann, 2013: 14).
We cannot understand the basic economic policy development and influences of the ECOWAS
region without a good scan of the regional powerhouse, Nigeria, and much to that is the bulwark
behind ECOWAS integration. What inspired ECOWAS literally has been explained in chapter
one, but here too, the section delves into the integration as organized under the leadership of
Nigeria as a regional hegemon. 
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Integration  theoretically  as  Hulse (2016:  12)  argues  embodies  “regional  power behaviour  as
driven by insecurity in their global or regional position” as neorealist stance. This is what Waltz
(1979:  107)  pointed  out  that  “In  a  self-help  system,  considerations  of  security  subordinate
economic gain to political interests.” Heinenon (2006: 22) explained Waltz saying,
According to  such a model  of  explanation,  the political  structure  of the  international
system thus constrains to a very large extent the room for manoeuvre that regional actors
may  have  in  regional  cooperation  because  they  have  to  take  into  account  how that
cooperation might  change the relative  position  of  other  countries  in  the  international
hierarchy.
Following this logical angle, the Nigerian quest for regionalisation in ECOWAS could not have
happened  without  possibly,  such  realist  arrière-pensée  underlying  the  Nigerian  move  in  the
1970s. Notwithstanding, the Pan-Africanist Nkrumah’s proposal for Africa integration had that
underlying sentiment of political and economic insecurity to pursue an agenda that using a single
state could certainly be a fiasco.
The figures 1 & 2. below gives the portrayal of the gigantic variance between Nigeria and other
ECOWAS states members. The Correlate of War Project on regional national material power
depicts Nigeria’s weight by fifty-four per cent (54%); and Nigeria takes a whooping eighty per
cent (80%) of GDP, all which has relevance to population size as successive order of countries
tell  from  the  pie  chart  below.  The  National  Material  Capabilities  Index  amalgamates  six
indicators of material capability: military expenditure, military personnel, energy consumption,
iron and steel production, urban population, and total population (Hulse 2016: 14).
Figure 2.  Correlates of War’s National Material Capabilities Index (NMCI) of Nigeria,
2007
Source: Correlate of War Project 2010. Cited in Hulse 2016: 15
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Figure 3. Nigeria’s and South Africa’s Share of Regional GDP, 2014
Source: IMF 2014. Captured from Hulse 2017: 15.
The enormity of the Nigerian economy and its population that gave the Nigerian state far wide
economic leverage above the majority of West African and African countries has also been its
temptation to wield power and benefit much economic advantage out of that. Nigeria in West
Africa faced the “domino-effect” in regionalism” terms (Hulse, 2016: 12) where it’s emerged
strength regionally could still be frustrated by the unequal weight of EU, USA and the economic
blocs from Latin America. Hulse (2016: 12) contends that,
Power  concerns  are  likely  to  drive  regional  power  behaviour  under  conditions  of
economic  or  political  uncertainty,  and  where  there  is  a  perception  among  national-
decision makers that uncertainty could have negative effects on state interests.
In the case of Nigeria, its realist  political  advisors are known to have influenced the country
taking  the  leadership  of  the  sub-region  integration  for  formidable  economic  and  political
supremacy in West Africa and Africa.
That goes on to the pointed that the Nigerian leadership of ECOWAS has not been welcomed
without overt suspicion, especially, by the West African Francophone niche of states (Page and
Bilal,  2001:  3-4).  And  much  above  that,  a  concern  by  Paris  as  that  has  serious  economic
implication for the manner the former colonial master has been holding the umbilical cord of its
former  colonies  uncut,  through viable  monetary  arrangements,  a  form of  trade  arrangement.
Hartmann (2013: 8) remarks “UEMOA… since 1994, have remained relatively closely linked to
France via a monetary union (Zone CFA) and to each other.” Early response from Europe had
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been mixed, but around the initiation period of ECOWAS, the European states were grappling
with the nitty-gritty of EU integration. Even though according to Heinenon (2006: 23) the realist
integration assumption had been contradicted in the case of EU formation, the reality of it seems
to have been justified in Africa in the case of ECOWAS and SADC.
The issues of rationale are not easy to determine unless in the course of the integration process,
behaviour by regional powerhouse begins to manifest. The unfolding actions and attitudes bare
issues that impinge on hidden interest. Some suspicion around Berlin and Paris had been cleared.
Germany, for example, had to make concessions with the French on reconciliation disclaiming
ulterior interests. Heinenon (2006: 78) explained that saying,  
In  practice,  their  application  includes  straight  budgetary  or  other  types  of  financial
transfers from one member state to another. Thus, one of the member states has to be
willing to financially compensate for the losses (finance development) of other member
states in return for the economic benefits that accrue to it from integration. Basically,
despite the risk of simplifying the picture considerably, Germany has taken this role in
the European context.
That  initiative  exonerated  Germany  from  neorealist  “insecurity”  and  “interests.”  Instead,
collective actors and other factors (which are not of interest for discussion here) had influenced
the EU integration. Juxtaposing this to ECOWAS integration with the EU case on powerhouse
arrière-pensée found Nigeria wanting by its behaviour in connection with concessions it has to
make in regard to tariff  and non-tariff  agreements  on third parties  that  Nigeria  had pains to
implement now as the leader in ECOWAS, naturally (Adedokun, 2009: 21). Hulse (2016: 13)
points out that,
Nigeria has subsequently played a strong leadership role in ECOWAS’ security sector,
but the ambition to lead does not extend to trade, where the country has proven to be a
difficult and obstructionist actor. Nigeria remains hampered by the systemic corruption
and  low  levels  of  government  efficiency  that  characterize  neo-patrimonial  regimes
(Cilliers  et  al.  2015,  see  Figure  4),  which may account  for  seemingly “irrational”  or
inefficient domestic and foreign policies (Henderson 2015: 131). Therefore, we might
expect rent-seeking to be a significant factor in explaining Nigeria’s behaviour in relation
to ECOWAS.
The political  rationale does not suffice and experts allude that the dimension of rent-seeking
through integration looks unheard of, but the reality of it is what Hulse (2006) raises as another
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factor besides power concerns that hide behind the Nigerian initiation of ECOWAS. So, among
four  drivers  of  regional  power  behaviour,  when  it  comes  to  power  concerns  and
neopatrimonialism and rent-seeking Nigeria has not been exonerated by its predictable attitude
around trade interests; which it could hardly negotiate at ease with economically weak member
states. Nigeria seldom is ready to give way to the broader region’s development considerations
over national interests (Engel & Jouanjean 2015: 12-13). Hulse (2016: 17) minces no words in
her further criticism “Nigeria has subsequently played a strong leadership role in ECOWAS’
security sector, but the ambition to lead does not extend to trade, where the country has proven to
be a difficult and obstructionist actor”.
Nigeria has come under the criticism several times over the manner it stands in the way of its
own organized regional integration project of ECOWAS over trade liberalisation arrangements.
According to Adedokun (2009: 21) “Nigeria accounts for 75 per cent of ECOWAS exports and
45 per cent of its imports and if Nigeria is excluded intraregional trade rises to 20 per cent”
shows  how  its  actions  can  impact  the  entire  region  external  ratio.   The  trading  aspect  of
integration underscores enhancing the free movement of people in the sub-region. Tanyanyiwa &
Huakuna (2014: 109) acknowledged that in the area of movement of business persons ECOWAS
has made “great stride” which at the same time has been negated according to other literature by
reality of border problems of methods being used, and interpretation of Protocols around trading
activities across borders in the sub-region (ECA-WA, 2015: 155-156). Engel & Jouanjean (2015:
12-13) also add that “the role of the Nigerian leadership is frequently singled out as presenting a
particular constraint to the implementation of integration protocols….. the government does not
view it as benefiting directly from regional integration”.
In that case the conditions of cross border trade in view of concessions it has to make. So figure
3.  above locates ECOWAS integration  status  and whilst  the East  African Counterparts  have
made strides in Customs union and Common market;  ECOWAS remain at the planned stage
because of the prime leader’s apparent disappointment over perceived power-sharing in current
trade and liberalisation arrangements.  Engel & Jouanjean (2015: 12-13) continue to castigate
West African giant saying, 
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Figure 4. Status of integration
Source: AfDB 2013 (cited in Vanheukelom et al. 2013 and Engel & Jouanjean 2015: 10)
Nigeria – viewing itself as an emerging global player in competition with South Africa
for continental primacy – regularly contributes to peacekeeping missions and puts much
more stock in the political and security functions of ECOWAS than potential economic
gains from integration.
That comes clear that currently Nigeria’s interest in regional conflict matters is heightened with
its readiness to provide intervention force. Over the past three years, the Nigerian economy has
suffered in performance and decline over various internal factors and most alluded factor being
high corruption and poor governance and mismanagement. The rule of law is weak in Nigeria
compared to most Southern Africa countries. Much to that, the issue of Bokoharam has had its
dent on the economy generally though not clear figure can be presented here. 
Figure 5. Real GDP growth - Nigeria
Source: AfDB, Statistics Department AEO. Estimates (e); projections (p).
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The  countries  macroeconomic  projection  for  2018  at  4.8  as  some  experts  predicted  remain
uncertain with critically high corruption level still prevalent.
Table 1. Macroeconomic indicators
Nigeria  resorted  to  austerity  with  the  accession  of  medically  weak  Buhari  to  instil  fiscal
discipline  in  honouring  various  external  credits  and  has  set  controls  on  the  use  of  foreign
exchange by the Nigerian Reserve Bank. 
According to Husle (2016: 19), the “major impediments to the functioning of the ECOWAS
Trade Liberalization Scheme (ETLS) in Nigeria include:
▪ The lack of legal recourse for violations of trade and free movement protocols as the
ECOWAS Court of Justice does not allow direct access in trade-related issues (more on
this issue below);
▪ The  prevalence  of  corrupt  customs  officials  at  border  posts  to  which  the  Nigerian
government either turns a blind eye or actively participates in. The lack of legal redress
encourages customs officials to erect illegal roadblocks and demand informal payments
from traders,  contravening  ECOWAS rules  (ECOWAS Vanguard  2013).  A Chatham
House report notes that unofficial “taxation” on cross-border trade has become a “rich
source of revenue for patronage networks” within Nigeria’s state agencies (Cited from
Hoffmann & Melly 2015: viii).
▪ The  lack  of  information  and  transparency  surrounding  the  trader’s  rights  under
community law. It is difficult to locate information about national laws and procedures
relating to the ETLS. Traders do not have access to information concerning their rights,
and the lack of transparency and information contributes to delays and informal payments
at control points.”
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that can help to gauge the impact of ECOWAS trade policies on the ground is the sub-region’s
profile on doing business that is published by the World Bank for all regional economic blocs
globally. In the case of cross-border trade, the Report shows “ECOWAS regional average ranked
just behind the SADC average at 132 out of 189 countries, with Niger (179), Burkina Faso (174),
Mali (163), Nigeria (159) and Cote d’Ivoire (158) among the forty worst performers.” On the
World Bank (2014: 4) rankings on business environment indicators the sub-region lingers on the
lower end of key indicators as shown in figure 6. below on starting business In the detailed
ranking for example “Niger ranks 177th for the ‘starting a business’ indicator, Liberia is 30th.
Similarly, Nigeria ranks 187th of 189 countries for ‘getting electricity’ while Ghana is 71st, and
Ghana ranks in the top 50 for ‘registering property’ and ‘getting credit’.” Engel and Jouanjean
commented on the chart “masks considerable heterogeneity among countries in the region” it
nevertheless gives some impression for comparative analysis.  Furthermore, Engel and Jouanjean
(2015: 4) find ECOWAS Commission own assessment identified  the main constraints to doing
business as “the regulatory environment for doing business, inadequate transport links, cost of
transport services and limited access to finance” in an assessment submitted as part of the
Figure 6. Rankings on Doing Business topics - ECOWAS
Source: World Bank 2014; Taking from Engel and Jouanjean (2015: 4)
Aid-for-Trade Global Review 2013 (see ECOWAS 2013). As far back as 1978, Bruce Zagaris
(1978: 117) analyse the ECOWAS integration initiative and drew a conclusion on trade saying
“no meaningful  trade can occur  without  basic  infrastructure integration,  developments  in the
areas of transportation and telecommunications are important prerequisites to the achievement of
prolific trade within ECOWAS”.
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Much of ECOWAS transport and telecommunication remain envisaged on paper by the lack of
funding.  The consequence of poor infrastructure has been “high transportation costs” and delays
in  the  movement  of  goods  and  people  (The  World  Bank  Group  2013:  XVIII,  34).  Poor
infrastructure also impacts negatively on market integration hindering access to the production
area, especially with agricultural products that can be perishable (Deen-Swarray, Adekunle and
Odularu, 2014: 32-33f). For example, The World Bank Group (2013: 38) Report indicates “The
cost  of  transportation  restricts  the  distribution  of  imported  rice  into  the  interior  of  Ghana.”
Meanwhile,  the  potential  yield  as  the  Report  states  “domestic  production  is  an  attractive
proposition,  given that imported  aromatic  rice has a retail  value of some US$ 280 million,”
which would save not only foreign exchange but also provide jobs for young people.
In Nigeria  another  World Bank Report  (2017:  41) has identified  the negative effect  of poor
infrastructure in causing unnecessary urbanization and congestion in Lagos saying:
The lack of transportation infrastructure hinders the natural expansion of the huge non-oil
growth agglomeration of Lagos and explains why so many manufacturing firms operate
within Lagos, where congestion and very high rents limit their competitiveness, while the
economies of neighbouring areas stagnate.
The example of Nigeria and Ghana (the latter whose economy size, though small, is second to
Nigeria in GDP and NMCI) implies that the other small economy states will have infrastructure
obviously  in  a  deplorable  state.  Hence,  that  serve  as  a  disincentive  for  investments  as
transportation cost remain high caused by weak and poor road in the sub-region. Even Nigeria
with the overwhelming large economy in the sub-region has very poor railway system, though
that could have been the most effective cheaper means to provide haulage of goods and people.
According to Edo & Ikelegbe (2014: 16-17), “the rail  system has also remained undeveloped for
several decades and characterized by outdated tracts with sharp curves and gradients, as well as the speed
limit of about 35 km/hr. The system has therefore been underutilized with only 50 per cent of its 280
railway stations functioning and passenger capacity utilization of about 10 per cent”. 
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to rural areas and interior places remain road and not good ones. ECOWAS has hinter areas and
landlocked states like Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso that depend on intra-regional trade. Having
these highly populated hinter areas served with only road networks is not adequate for expedited
trade  and  business  within  an  economically  integrated  region.  The  disadvantage  of  poor
transportation has a reflection on overall  economic performance and economy. And it  is  not
surprising much of Nigeria’s poorest economic performance years 2014 into 2016 (see figure 3
above) have seen severe barriers to the movement of people and goods caused by Bokoharam in
the North and the rebel attempt to hit the entire nation with attacks. Nigeria export to Chad and
Sudan might have been severely affected. 
Figure 7. Size and economic structure of ECOWAS members
Source: Engel and Jouanjean (2015: 8) cited from von Uexkull 2012 (p. 418),
data from World Bank World Development Indicators
In addition, the impact of poor roads and railways contributes to ECOWAS population disparity.
Nigeria, Ivory Coast and Ghana’s over urbanisation with average roads in the main centres of
manufacturing and high population has its impact on individual GDP as illustrated in figure 5.
above. Areas like Liberia, Sierra Leone have suffered further deterioration from the devastation
caused by protracted civil wars. In as much of Sierra Leone’s economy depends on exports to the
West and not within the sub-region makes infrastructure linking other neighbours not a pressing
issue. Sierra Leone trade with ECOWAS neighbours is reported to be less than ten per cent
(10%) (Deen-Swarray et al, 2014: 32). Yet Ivory Coast suffered similarly but is managing in
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recovering and making progress with manufacturing restored and GDP growth among one of the
highest in the region. Another transportation issue that affects ECOWAS business is the use of
waterways, especially the Sea to transport goods along the coastal regions. Whilst cargo can take
two days to reach Accra from Lagos, it seldom happens that way. It instead takes barely a month
for such shipment to arrive according to Nigeria-Ghana Chamber of Commerce (Deen-
Swarray et al, 2014: 35). The reason is that ships have to be re-routed via Europe or elsewhere as
protocol requires before returning to the same West African destination. So the ample weeks
added  constitute  real  cost  to  a  business  depending  on  shipping  though  supposed  to  be  the
cheapest. Effective transportation Deen-Swarray et al (2014: 35) argues,
… improvement in a domestic country’s infrastructure quality would raise exports and
imports by 14.5 % and 19.6 % respectively. However, the impact is found to be higher in
the case of an improvement in the transit country's infrastructure quality. In this case,
export would increase by 52 % (Cited from Grigoriou, 2007)
So much of low trade among ECOWAS member states comparative to SADC and EAC has the
poor state of transport infrastructure is one of the major factors causing that. Nevertheless, the
nature of the context proves the potential for trade growth regionally. 
Over the years, plans to improve the entire ECOWAS highways and to facilitate expected trade
within the sub-region have been done but remain to be funded with some initiatives taken place. 
Table 2. List of PIDA projects in West Africa
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Project
title
Summary description
Total
cost
(US$
millions
)
Location
(countries)
Abidjan-Lagos Coastal 
Corridor 
Modernise heavily travelled ARTIN corridor 
in West Africa. Trade facilitation, 
OSBPs, capacity enhancement and implementation
of PPP for five countries: Côte-d‟Ivoire, Ghana, 
Togo, Bénin et Nigéria 
290 Nigeria, Benin, 
Togo, 
Ghana, Côte-d‟ 
Ivoire 
Dakar-Niamey 
Multimodal Corridor 
Modernise heavily travelled ARTIN corridor in 
West Africa. Trade facilitation, OSBPs, capacity 
enhancement and implementation of PPP) for four 
countries: Senegal, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger 
590 Senegal, Mali, 
Burkina Faso, 
Niger 
Praia-Dakar-Abidjan 
Multimodal Corridor 
Improve marine transport and the connection 
between island and mainland countries by creating 
a new maritime service between regional ports and 
a modern information system to link the maritime 
service with ports and roads in the Dakar-Abidjan 
Corridor. Would also modernise one of the most 
heavily travelled ARTIN corridors in West Africa. 
Trade facilitation, OSBPs, capacity enhancement 
(possibly through PPP) for eight countries: Cabo 
Verde, Senegal, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, 
Sierra-Leone, Liberia, Côte-d‟ Ivoire 
150 Cabo Verde, 
Senegal, 
Gambia, Guinea- 
Bissau, Guinea, 
Sierra- Leone, 
Liberia, 
Côte-d‟Ivoire 
Abidjan-
Ouagadougou/Bamako 
Modernise and rehabilitate multi-modal corridor 
damaged by civil war in Côte d'Ivoire 
540 Côte-d‟Ivoire, 
Burkina Faso, 
Mali 
West Africa Hub Port 
and Rail Programme 
Address future capacity problems in West African 
ports with two components: (a) a regional hub port 
and rail linkage master plan and (b) port expansion
2 140 15 countries, 
PMAWCA 
West Africa Air 
Transport 
Increase air transport service levels in West Africa,
which are currently limited by the lack of a 
regional air hub 
420 15 countries 
Source: Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa. Cited in ECA-WA (2015: 58)
Table 2. above shows the extensive nature of the network of roads and other transportation mode
planned. Deen-Swarray et al (2014: 44) reveal that the access links and roads in the sub-region
are below expectation:
The total road network in sub-Saharan Africa is still comparatively low at about 204 km
per 1,000 km2 of land area, with only about 25 % paved. This is way below the world
average of 944 km per 1,000 km2 of land area (Cited from AfDB 2010).
The neglect of such projects that are a cornerstone to the integration process is a political matter.
There internal routes of individual states must be an internal issue at this stage of the integration.
More to that the nature of how some of these projects  have become daunting to implement
financially, endorses speeding the integration process which could enable the region to pull their
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resources together to work on projects effectively. Table 3. shows the current ECOWAS inter-
state corridors and their quality status.
Table 3. Corridors in the ECOWAS sub-region and their current state
Corridors Good (%) Fair (%) Poor (%) Paved (%)
Abidjan-Lagos
Tema-Ouagadougou-Bamako
Dakar-Bamako
Abidjan- Ouagadougou
Lome-Niamey
Cotonou-Niamey
51
67
48
33
50
50
28
31
20
23
30
8
21
2
32
44
20
42
99
100
100
100
100
99
Source: AICD 2010. Cited in Deen-Swarray, Adekunle and Odularu (2014: 45) 
The onus remains that if ECOWAS states believe in integration and for progress achieved to be
sustained implies a deeper commitment to matters that materialize the goals being pursued. The
uniting of citizens without business interactions and the major trading and market depending
solely on the external market is not strategic planning. Should there be some global crisis could
plunge the region into severe crisis as well. 
We find that in the Asian world they have taken advantage of the high population to develop
internal market within states and the region which is well pronounced in China and among the
Asian Tigers,  the ASEAN. Other  means of  transportation  such as  airports  and ports  remain
below expectation with Lagos and Accra providing the main busy airports in the region as well
as harbours (Deen-Swarray et al, 2014: 46). The integration could serve to distribute these
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Figure 8. Rail, roads and airports networks in ECOWAS
Source: Deen-Swarray et al (2014: 45)
facilities  depending  on  how they  become  resourceful  for  the  sub-region  trade  and  expedite
business activities for economic growth. Hence, in the area of transportation ECOWAS does not
evince the example Africa can immolate unless much energy is applied to the existing plans to
translate them into viable implemented projects.
5.2.1 Monetary, Fiscal and Investments Policies in ECOWAS
The success of the ECOWAS integration will depend on its sustainable ability to local revenue
generation.  Much of the ECOWAS states are weak in generating local revenue which is not
good indicative for convergence. To compensate for the weak countries in monetary terms the
plan to establish a Fund for Co-operation, Compensation and Development to finance regional
infrastructure have not proceeded as expected all due to regional politicking (Hartmann, 2015:
10). The focus on ECOWAS people’s business growth as a base for achieving a stable economy
in the sub-region by promoting intra-regional trade has also remained a political issue. In view of
that Hartmann (2013: 10-11) has been critical that, “the private economic sector in ECOWAS
countries was simply too weak to pressure governments to remove trade barriers or to benefit
81
from heavy protectionist measures. Governments also relied strongly on income from taxes and
duties and were thus reluctant to lower tariffs”.
However, there are other informal sector traders associations in Nigeria that have been able to
influence the Government against any concession to endorsing the ECOWAS customs union.
That has given an odd outlook about Nigeria’s position as focusing on self-interest and a “barrier
to regional trade and development” (Hulse, 2017: 19f). Some literature describe the Nigerian
obduracy to ECOWAS trade and custom matters as caused by “shadow state” where the state
and  the  new integration  platforms  (“shadow regionalism”)  is  used  by  some corrupt  interest
groups to maintain graft and abuse of state facilities to enrich themselves (Hulse, 2017: 13-14;
Fanta, 2008). However, in the frustration ECOWAS face to implement free-trade areas and a
customs union have galvanized Union Economique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine (UEMOA) the
CFA Zone states members (which comprises of Francophone countries and Guinea Bissau) to
achieved  “successful  harmonization  of  macro-economic  and monetary  policies”  by  virtue  of
being linked to France (EU member state) and the guarantee of stability from the Euro-zone
(Hartmann, 2015: 10). 
Meanwhile, establishing the West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ) as second monetary union
since 2000 in Bamako by Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria and Sierra Leone have faced series of
postponement “three times, namely, from January 2003 to December 2005, later from December
2005 to December 2009 and then from December 2009 to 1 January 2015 and finally from 2015
to the 2020 deadline” (ECA 2015: 79). The result has been a lack of growth in intra-regional
trade which also serves to express a lack of confidence.
ECA-WA (2015: 82) have commended the WAEMU bloc members for being more efficient than
WAMZ in terms of compliance with the convergence criteria (Cited from Lama J., 2011); stating
that “For the period 2008-2013, Niger, Nigeria and Senegal met most criteria (8 of 11) while the
Gambia, Ghana and Sierra Leone have the least attractive prospects with only 4, 3, and 4 criteria
met, respectively.” 
The document (ECA-WA, 2015: 81) further listed a number of problems in the implementation
of  the  monetary  convergence.  The  document  shows:  “The  assessment  report  on  the
implementation of activities  of the Roadmap on the ECOWAS Single Currency Programme,
which  was  adopted  in  October  2013  in  Lagos,  identified  several  constraints  in  its
implementation, notably the following:
82
✔ Inadequate financial resources to support the implementation of some key activities of the
roadmap;
✔ Inadequate human resources (in quantity and quality) to ensure the implementation of
certain activities of the roadmap in an efficient manner and at the proper date at both
regional and national levels;
✔ Low capacity shown by some Member States in producing reliable statistics and in good
time for multilateral surveillance activities;
✔ An  insufficient  political  will  to  speed  up  the  ratification,  domestication  and
implementation of legal instruments (conventions and protocols);
✔ Low level of effective participation by Ministers of Finance and Governors of Central
Banks in meetings of the ECOWAS Convergence Council;
✔ Lack of awareness of the effective implementation of the ECOWAS Single Currency
Programme among the populations as well as among targeted actors and specific groups,
such as the authorities in charge of immigration, parliamentarians, customs officials, etc.;
✔ Frequency of external shocks affecting the fiscal and external performance of Member
States and, consequently, performance in terms of macroeconomic convergence;
✔ Structurally weak taxation base within a context of high incompressible expenditures.”
Actually, space will not allow for much elucidation on this, but the indications emerging with
how ECOWAS leaders and their states cannot sacrifice some short-term inward-looking and self-
interests,  to act  in a manner that secures the sub-region entirely in supranational  mechanism
capable to deliver effectively the political and economic goods is woeful and myopic, not only
for the sub-region but the continent at large. In the words of Garcia and Seron (2014: 48-49)
“The process of economic and monetary integration is very slow. Pushing the MS artificially to
achieve the macroeconomic convergence targets could have some negative impacts on the States
and their citizens, to the detriment of inclusive growth, which is essential for the development of
the MS and the region.”
5.2.2 Human Resource Development in ECOWAS
The ECOWAS Organisation with its structures of the institution has a problem of adequate staff
at the Secretariat, the Court of Justice, Science & Technology projects among other sectors due
to skills shortage (Alabi 2013: 125, 235; Economic Commission for Africa/ECOWAS undated,
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p.67). Alabi (2013: 125) recommended for the “training of lawyers on how to access the Court,
and citizen’s protection of their rights through the Court” which should be part of the human
resource improvement.
At the social  level schools in West Africa are generally ill-equipped with required tools and
machinery for training and lack of teachers of requisite skills. The problem of shortage of artisan
skills remains a burden for investors, considering capital infrastructure and industrial projects
which are financed from outside with the aim of transferring skills. The situation where FDI’s
have to import quality skills far above the required level as stipulated in agreements defeat the
purpose  of  FDI  job  creation.  According  to  Broadman  (2007:  25),  “Chinese  and  Indian
governments  are  providing  or  investing  in  resources  for  greater  technical  cooperation  with
African countries so as to facilitate such technological transfers, among other objectives”.
The  arrangement  of  transfers  of  skills  cannot  happen  in  ECOWAS  region  through
industrialisation and certain other capital projects if the ECOWAS fails to have quality basic
education and secondary level training that are adequate for prevailing market needs of business
management,  industrial  and  agricultural  projects.  In  the  current  situation  of  the  ill-funded
education  sector,  such  privilege  does  not  exist  in  many  parts  of  West  African  countries,
especially the rural schools. 
The other side is the issue of brain-drain and has been another factor that has caused a shortage
of  skills  in  the  sub-region  and  the  continent  at  large.  The  weak  economies  and  sometimes
political mischiefs have made many scholars, experts and technical people relocate outside the
sub-region and the continent. 
5.3 SADC’s Economics and Trade
This section as we review aspects of SADC economic integration on economic, trade, monetary
conditions and human resource development. To begin with, a general review of the key aspects
of SADC trade regulations is done before the dominant state in the sub-region South Africa’s
economic role in SADC is scrutinized on its leadership and impact on the members of SADC.
We find a majority  of African sub-regional  integration is  based on homogametic  integration
which does differ from the EU and so the internal issues that determined the need for integration
as a means to economic and political transformations vary extensively. 
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In the EU, as the problem of inter-state conflict was the big issue and World Wars devastation.
The resort to economic integration from the onset (and inevitably political) have considered the
need to avert security threat by shared economic values and interests. The need to foster unity
among  the  diverse  European  ethnic  groups  has  been  essential  by  the  kind  of  theoretically
designed and practically conducive integration that enables free movement of people of diverse
cultures to mingle, and the sense of shared community. Today as we find EU extending beyond
eastern  Germanic,  Czech,  etc.  groups  to  Turkish  and  some  of  the  former  Soviet  allied
Communist states. The discussion here is to understand why after SADC opting for economic
integration have still not made any serious headway that practically impact the condition of weak
states growing strong and required amelioration of poverty condition in the sub-region; and not
the least the dire factor of DRC conflict which had stayed as an illusion for SADC.
Several researchers and experts have different views and sharply remain critical about SADC
having been too slow in the long-term on laisser-faire approach if not in principle a failed goal.
Ndulo (1999: 23) pointed out that,
SADC  countries  must  realize  that  economic  integration,  by  its  very  definition,  is  a
process designed to completely abolish discrimination between local and partner goods,
services and sectors over an agreed period of time. In other words, economic integration
expands  the  effective  market  horizon  within  which  economic  agents  can  move  the
resources  they  hope  to  utilize  productively.  In  the  short  term,  such  movement  can
translate into unequal benefits among countries participating in the integration scheme.
What is important is to maintain a long term perspective of the process as the benefits for
a participating region are bound to come in the long run.
In  consideration  of  Ndulo  views,  the philosophy  that  shapes  SADC economic  and regional
commerce is of concern. Not forgetting the allegation pointed out by Gaddafi in chapter one
(Section 1.1.), that the protagonist states in ECOWAS and SADC only serve a neoliberal agenda
than  the  required  developmental  affairs  of  the  regions.  Actually,  SADC  agenda  has  been
neoliberal considering the might of South Africa’s leadership. Currently, also, not any of the
SADC states espouse any diverse economic strategy apart from neoliberal and free-market. So
all SADC member states knowingly appended to the SADC trade Protocol as:
…to liberalize  intra-regional  trade in  goods  and services;  ensure  efficient  production
within  SADC which  reflects  the  current  and  dynamic  comparative  advantages  of  its
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members; contribute towards the improvement of the climate for domestic, cross border
and  foreign  investment;  and  enhance  the  economic  development,  diversification  and
industrialization of the region (Protocol on Trade in the Southern African Development
Community (SADC, Article 2; Ndulo 1999: 19)
The core rule and goal is to the elimination of tariffs within eight years of its entry into force. In
coming out with such a policy SADC had other blocs within its members where South Africa,
Swaziland, Botswana, Lesotho and Namibia formed Southern Africa Customs Union (SACU) as
a  free trade area with common external tariffs. Ndulo (1999: 23) further argues that “there will
have to be an agreed formula on how SADC and SACU tariffs are to be harmonized with the
view to have one level  of tariffs  for the whole community” and they are tied to third-party
disagreements. That entails a lot of complexities which today had saddled SADC Secretariat on
the way forward with the integration and blocs interests  intermixed.  Chanda (2010: 21) also
argues that “It has to be noted that countries under any circumstance cannot belong to more than
one  customs  union.  Southern  African  countries  are  facing  these  problems  because  of  the
overlapping membership existing in the region.” Vanheukelom & Bertelsmann-Scott (2016: 20)
explained that “Zimbabwe has historically been an advocate of regional industrialisation policy
and argued that there should not be any further liberalisation of trade in the region without an
industrial policy in place.” Zimbabwe, in particular, has become the main contending force in
SADC to South Africa’s overwhelming weight and leadership with the tendency to imposing its
interests. 
The reality also rests with the discouraging weaknesses of the majority of the SADC member
states to attract investors. Such condition requires what Ndulo (1999: 22-23) describes as the
need and importance for SADC states to recognise the critical role played by South Africa as an
economic leader in the sub-region championing regional political economy. The fact as Undulo
(1999: 22-23) points out that, “individually, many of the SADC countries do not have the necessary
conditions to attract  substantial  inflows of foreign investment.  In many of the countries,  markets are
simply too small, skills too scarce, infrastructure inadequate and investment opportunities too limited.
The picture changes dramatically when an investor is assured access to the regional market”.
That clearly accentuate the inevitable role of South Africa, and that cannot just happen without
some benefit for that coverage in the neoliberal understanding.
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                Figure 9. South Africa’s Share of Regional GDP, 2014
Source:  IMF 2014. Captured in Hulse 2015: 15.
Figure 10. Correlates of War’s National Material Capabilities Index (NMCI) of 
South Africa, 2007
Source: Correlate of War Project 2010. Cited in Hulse 2016: 15
The  question  arises  if  South  Africa  by  its  sheer  importance,  like  Nigeria,  is  frustrating  the
integration by its role for undue advantage? The issue then reverts back to the SACU bloc, as to
why SACU cannot be scrapped for the formation of SADC Customs Union and what is at stake
for South Africa?
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A World Bank (2014: 28) Report revealed that South Africa under-reported its trade statistics
with SACU members to the international community.  According to the World Bank (2014: 28):
In November 2013 the South African Revenue Service revised its reporting of trade data
to  include  exports  and  imports  with  its  Southern  African  Customs  Union  (SACU)
partners:  Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, and Swaziland.  (Prior to this date, the official
balance of payments statistics included estimates of bilateral trade with Southern African
Customs Union partners.) The effect was a deep cut into South Africa’s reported trade
deficit. The reason for the revision is that trade data reported by South African customs
authorities—including both to the United Nations (through Comtrade,  its  Commodity
Trade  Statistics  Database)  and  through  the  Exporter  Dynamics  Database,  the  two
principal sources used for this analysis—grossly underreport trade with SACU partners
(by between 96.0 per cent  and 99.7 per  cent  across  years compared with the  figures
reported in the SACU Statistical Database). So, most analytical work on South Africa’s
trade, including the analysis in this report, ignores trade with SACU partners.
It is no anomaly to note that South Africa economic strength, by and large, also depends on its
trading into Africa and not only SADC. For the past five years, South Africa has faced tough
deregulation measures imposed by Western trading partners to the frustration of the former. For
example,  South African wine, poultry, some fruits like orange and other products have faced
undue compliance measures. EU did not want to buy South African wine bottled in 2015. Black
spots on Limpopo oranges that have nothing to do with the health of oranges and its quality were
used. Poultry sector faced counter-vailing of European and American poultry exports of which
the Obama regime got South Africa under pressure to endorse or risk diminished African Growth
Opportunity  Act  (AGOA)  conditions,  as  trading  arrangement.  Meanwhile,  local  poultry
contributed  more than 16.6% of its  share of gross domestic  product  (GDP) in South Africa
agriculture sector. Furthermore, the World Bank (2014: 28) Report shows South Africa:
“In 2011/12 the total  value of South Africa’s exports  to SACU partners was close to $12.7
billion, with Botswana and Namibia together accounting for more than 72 per cent (figure 12 &
13). Including exports to SACU countries has major implications for the export storyline:
▪ It nearly doubles the value of exports to Africa, making Africa easily the largest regional 
market for goods exports, at more than 25 per cent of South Africa’s total.
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▪ If fuels, ores, and metals are removed, SACU markets alone account for 19 per cent of 
South Africa’s nonmineral exports, and Africa overall accounts for more than 50 per 
cent.
▪ Manufacturing dominates the basket of goods exports to SACU markets, at more than 63 
per cent of the total, but it accounts for just 39 per cent of exports to global markets.”
Besides  SACU  members  being  an  export  destination  for  South  African  manufactured  and
agricultural products, the rest of SADC including the rest of Sub-Saharan African market has
seen the rise in South African exports. According to the World Bank (2014: 27):
The mix of South African exports by subsector is very similar across the two markets,
with African markets more important for machinery and chemicals exports and European
markets more important for material based manufactures. Africa has grown more than
Europe since 2002, but  the 2008–09 crisis brought a substantial shift—exports to the
European Union fell 39 per cent, but exports to Africa fell only 16 per cent. And exports
to Africa (53 per cent) have recovered much more than those to Europe (22 per cent)
since the crisis.
Figure 11. Manufacturing dominates South Africa’s exports to its Southern African.
Source: World Bank (2014: 28).
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Figure 12. Manufacturing dominates South Africa’s exports to its Southern African
Source: SACU Statistical Database. Captured from World Bank (2014: 28).
Figure  14.  &  15.,  below  shows  Sub-Saharan  Africa  displacing  Europe  as  South  Africa’s
nonmineral  export  destination  of  choice,  as  exports  trend shows satisfactory  growth and the
opportunity for expansion and increasing the market space across the continent. South Africa has
achieved  that  open  market  by  just  its  economic  weight  on  the  continent.  Since  the  era  of
democratization from 1994, the Africa National Congress (ANC) has intervened in a number of
issues  providing supports  in  conflict  resolution  and peacekeeping,  hosting massive refugees,
support  to  the AU Commission and hosting  the  Conference  that  changed OAU to AU, and
individual African states; at the same time taking up certain challenges like hosting the FIFA
World Cup in 2010 and among many other endeavours the country does to lift the face of Africa
as backward and incapable continent. In light of that, some of these activities have served to
open market doors across the continent. Other countries in West Africa and Eastern Africa have
opened their doors to South African investments, and the response has been some Southern  
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      Figure 13. Evolution of total exports to Africa and the European Union, 1995–2012
       Source:  UN Comtrade (database) via the World Integrated Trade Solution. Captured from World Bank  
       2014: 28
African Supermarkets, Mining firms, DSTV, Financial institutions, Services Companies, Mobile 
Companies like MTN and other Corporate have taken advantage to move out onto Africa. South 
African manufactured machines and chemicals (especially for agriculture purposes) have Africa 
as its most export destination. So the trend in figures 14. and 15., is show an accurate trend of 
African market open to South Africa currently.
Figure 14. Average annual new exporter entry by selected target market
 Exporter Dynamics Database, based on data from the South. Captured from World Bank 2014: 28
It can be seen that South Africa in addition to other avenues, especially, with the open door to
BRICS which she is a member, has not limited itself to Arica; but pushing further to consolidate
its markets by the value of its geopolitical position as a continental force that is not negotiable as
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expected by Nigeria. That remaining as bigger interest can underscore the country’s Industrial
Policy  Action  Plan  (IPAP)  and  the  new  National  Development  Plan  with  its  provost  on
industrialization.  How does such interest  interfere in the overall  portraiture of SADC and its
development? The argument of Vanheukelom & Bertelsmann-Scott (2016: 21) explicate that: 
South Africa  is  the SADC member state  with the  most  developed national  industrial
policy in the form of the National Industrial Policy Framework and an annual Industrial
Policy Action Plan (IPAP). It is premised on a specific set of incentives that are largely
unique  to  South  Africa  given  the  structure  of  its  economy,  its  history,  political
institutions, the ideology of the economic ministers and officials, available resources, and
the tripartite relationship between the state, business and labour. At the same time, there
is a very little economic or political incentive for South Africa to push for, or even accept
a regional process on industrial development that will compromise its domestic policy
space.
The stance thus taking by South Africa vis-à-vis its  neighbours on economic clutches  evade
South Africa as an economic ethical issue, but pragmatism and expediency count here. The fact
is that some of these countries actually depend much on the credit of South Africa for global
face, indeed. The most capable ones like DRC and Angola have much of their commitment given
to  RECs in Central  African  and Great  Lakes  structures.  Vanheukelom & Bertelsmann-Scott
(2016:  20)  further  explain  that  these  two  states  have  powerful  systemic  entities  in  Europe
namely, Belgium and Portugal (as former colonial masters) and China and the US rivalry playing
out also there. So there is room for South Africa to manoeuvre the situation to its interest under
SACU than SADC.
Having identified the position of South Africa does not deliver the answer outright because in the
case of SADC, unlike ECOWAS, the playout of interest is not provost on one state entity like
Nigeria. Hulse (2017: 17) concurs that: 
…SADC itself was never a hegemonic project initiated and driven by a regional power;
rather,  it  was  a  counter-hegemonic  organization  explicitly  designed  to  oppose  and
undermine the dominance of a hostile regional power. As a result of this historical legacy,
democratic  South  Africa  avoids  making  explicit  claims  to  regional  or  continental
leadership, as South African elites are highly cognizant of abstaining from any behaviour
reminiscent of the Apartheid years (Cited from Flemes 2009).
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Zimbabwe’s economy has declined abysmally to only have two per cent share of SADC GDP
(see figure 8.) and its NMCI is just five per cent, but it nevertheless contrives antics to show its
importance in the sub-region, and to let South Africa understand it cannot have its cake and the
pie at the same time. This goes to support the issues relating to the formation of SADC out of
SADCC, thus, seniority matters with the hard to change lock-in mindset of liberationist leaders.
Currently,  it  is  uncertain  at  the  time  of  compiling  this  dissertation  if  the  new  regime  of
Mnangagwa (still ZANU-PF Government) in Zimbabwe after Military Officers forced Mugabe
to resign, will change the Zimbabwean position as it stands now on industrialization plan before
FTA. Hence, in SADC, it can be deduced that there are countervailing forces of interests, which
are  working  and  entrapped  in  the  sub-regions  frustration  with  liberationism  and  its  path-
dependency that entangles the region from emerging out of its liberation cocoon onto sustainable
economic development.
In the midst of interest issues which remain unresolved among SADC members with different
blocs,  memberships  continue  to  wedge the  Organisation  form the  cohesion  required.  So the
stance as it now remains sharp contentions and suspicions towards South Africa over misusing
SACU.  Flatter (2001: 6) is of the view that, 
Fear  of  transhipment  of  South  African  goods  through  the  BLNS  countries
apparently made the nation-SACU countries reluctant to grant accelerated tariff
reductions on imports of goods from BLNS countries that might be produced in
South Africa as well. As a result, a number of the BLNS countries feel they have
gained very little from the provision for differentiated tariff offers to South Africa
and to the remaining SADC members.
The current contentious states of SADC and SACU requires the need to let members opt-out to
the choice of one group, is better to eliminate the divergent notion of suspicions that continue to
stagnate the Organisation from progress. Ndulo (1999: 23) says “In the long term the existence
of SACU is inconsistent with that of SADC” and the evidence is clear in a manner of fact that
the two entities are creating friction for each other, where some members belong to the two sides.
Chanda (2010: 25) categorically raise the point that once,
Some SADC countries use the tariffs as instruments for industrial policy to protect their
sensitive sectors (such as the South African motor industry) and others such as Mauritius
use a lower tariff as a vehicle for their integration into the global economy. The majority
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use  tariffs  as  a  revenue-generating  instrument  for  public  budgetary  purposes.  Hence
negotiating and subsequent setting of a SADC CET will face formidable challenges of
balancing diverse and conflicting revenue and industrial policy interests of the SADC
countries.
How to resolve the conflicting and overlapping interests remains SADC’s elephant in the room.
The fact as it stands is that SADC has one goal it is pursuing and that is economic integration. If
differences  and interests  cannot  be reconciled to achieve  the very aim the members  want to
attain, though by a different route, thus growth and development, then it must be admitted that
SADC is near its crisis. What is the malfeasance about the integration, as Gaddafi fowling South
Africa and Nigeria as neoliberal agents is nevertheless an inevitable project as Söderbaum (2004)
relocate the issue within Southern Africa economic integration.
Söderbaum (2004: 74) had been critical of Thabo Mbeki’s statement7 which did assign a new
role to states in inauspicious acknowledgement that the countries remain weak; and to augment
their  capacity  would mean the inclusion  of  stakeholders  to  make the state  diminish its  role.
However,  theoretically  and  conceptually  (considering  experts  such  as  Deutsch,  Hass  and
Lindberg  assumptions),  that  justifies  the  need  for  integration,  to  enable  the  state  limits  its
sovereignty (out of “state-centric worldview”) to enable new paradigm of broader and capable
governance  that  supersede  its  boundaries  to  guarantee  “security  community,”  using
“supranational institutions” and its spill-over benefits (Heinenon, 2005: 50ff; Ilievski, 2015: 5f).
Theoretical literature would underscore the veracity of Mbeki scholarly in identifying the crisis
of the majority of state across Africa and the need to transcend gnawing underdevelopment by
doing the right thing – integrate or unite.
To Gadhafi, Söderbaum and others find the issue of integration as essential as it is, yet depending
on  its  regional  leaders,  especially  in  the  case  of  SADC  and  ECOWAS  with  only  single
overwhelming  regional  economic  powerful  states  mean  much to  be  desired.  The  matters  of
innocence is eroded, for example taking the case of South Africa where business has ample
control over the state, the fact of “‘Good governance’ is thus defined as ‘less government’ and
‘getting  the  prices  right’  (Thompson,  2000:  45;  cited  in  Söderbaum  (2004:  74)  becomes
7 Thabo Mbeki:
Accordingly, and again driven by our painful experience, many on our continent have introduced new economic policies which 
seek to create conditions that are attractive to both domestic and foreign investors, encourage the growth of the private sector, 
reduce the participation of the state in the ownership of the economy and, in other ways, seek to build modern economies. 
(Mbeki, 1998: 247)
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inevitable. Thus Söderbaum minces no words that “The project of market integration should not
be singled out from the broader and more general project of neoliberalism. Neoliberalism and
market integration go hand in hand in the Southern African context,” and certainly, all the sub-
regional integrations. 
Further on Söderbaum (2004: 73) is of the view that SADC integration and its design,
…operate  within  the  larger  context  of  economic  reform  programmes  and  structural
adjustment,  thereby  making  reform/adjustment  and  market  integration  mutually
reinforcing. Its objectives are to (i) dismantle barriers that have traditionally resulted in
high transaction costs of cross-border flows of goods and factor markets; (ii) liberalize
trade and exchange rate systems; (iii) deregulate cross-border investment and strengthen
financial intermediation; and (iv) promote a new economic integration paradigm based on
competition and efficiency in regional markets with low protection vis-à-vis third parties.
SADC vision hinges on a consensus which Söderbaum argues that they are “voluntary action and
peer  pressure  versus  treaty  obligation.”  Söderbaum's  orientation  supposedly  from  the  left
complicates  the  matter.  The  private  sector  must  participate  actively  in  nation-building  or
regionalism.  Politicians  alone  cannot  be  entrusted  with  the  multifaceted  nature  of  nation-
building, let alone complexities of regional integration. The economic environment in Africa has
two levels of the private sector. They are the formal and the informal private sectors with the
latter being the largest micro-level activity (sometimes unrecognized as part of the main African
economy, especially in South Africa). Both sectors have to advocate for appropriate business
environment policies and not necessarily neoliberalism? If the African economies can grow, will
inevitably,  depend on the private  sector  active  role  in  the economy.  The reason Communist
China  has  made  room for  market  and  economic  liberalisation  is  that  it  helps  in  attracting
investment capital and effective in condition of regional blocs. Yongding (2005: 104) argues that
“liberalized capital markets are not only preconditions for monetary integration but also results
of the efforts in promoting the integration in the region.” The liberalized market can be inimical
for a weak state economy to compete effectively. That is the reason integration is the practical
model to meet the forceful and prevailing nature of global market liberalisation practice. 
 In as much as Gaddafi, Söderbaum and like-minded of their orientation may be right or wrong,
the onus rest with Africa generally as a continent,  where much of what is done is copied or
transplanted as a template from elsewhere than hybridizing local foundations. Market and trading
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are not something new to Africa. As far back before Europe developed, Africa has all manner of
inter-regional and intra-regional trading routes. The problem of Africa today it is not that African
Governments do not have better alternatives to turn to, but choices are deliberately imposed by
donors who have the interest of the continent least at heart. That has been the manner of policy
formulation  since  African  states  gained  political  independence  without  economic  liberation.
However,  in  some way,  the  obvious  question  comes  as  should  integration  be  a  mechanism
driving  entire  regions  into  unfettered  liberalism  and  neoliberal  catchment?  Can  integration
sidetrack neoliberal patterns and imperialism agenda, and carry socialist or other characters by
avoidance  of  features  of  neoliberalism?  These  are  political-economic  questions  but  have  an
orientation in the fiscal and investment policies aspects of integration.
5.3.1 Monetary and Investment Policies
This  sub-section  reviews  the  harmonization  of  monetary  and  investment  policies  in  SADC
towards  expected  convergence  as  one  of  the  cardinal  steps  to  achieve  effective  functional
integration.  Experts agree that for any economic integration to be consummated requires “high
degree  of  unification  of  monetary,  fiscal  and  other  policies”  (Heinenon,  2005:  68;  see  also
Söderbaum, 2004: 23; Ndulo, 1999: 24). In SADC though majority of the countries have weak
institution which includes the financial sector, the region is privileged to have South Africa with
“sophisticated financial infrastructure” to rely on for effective development of SADC monetary
union (Maasdorp and Whiteside,  1992: 44-45. Cited in Odén 1996: 17; and Heinenon, 2005:
149). Against the backdrop of strong financial bedrock of South Africa to bulwark SADC, much
remain to be done within the stipulated demand of the Finance Protocol and its milestones:
These key milestones include as a first step the attainment of a SADC Free Trade Area
(FTA) by 2008. This milestone was reached when the Heads of States and Government in
SADC launched the FTA in August 2008. The next milestone is the launch of Customs
Union  by  2010,  and  a  common  market  by  2015  which  will  be  followed  by  the
establishment of a SADC central bank by 2016 and eventually a SADC currency by 2018
(Belle, undated: 86).
As in  any system that  has  to  work  in  the  human  community  the  financial  side  has  greater
leverage to reckon with as the pivot and medium for all activities. The role of “banking, finance
and the movement of capital and goods” are of such enormous effect on the integration context.
Hence  Belle  (undated,  p.  24)  continues  to  explain  that  “it  is  necessary  to  ensure  continued
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reforms in the financial  sector for the achievement of effective economic integration such as
reforms to improve the monetary control mechanisms; institutional and regulatory reforms to
improve efficiency and soundness of financial  systems; and the adequacy of the interest rate
structure”. 
To ensure monetary policies are sound and updated to ease the complex activities involved in the
financial side of integration “SADC has established an Independent Committee of Governors of
Central  Banks.  The  Committee  has  established  a  small  specialized  secretariat  and  research
facility within the South African Reserve Bank to serve the Committee of Governors” (Ndulo,
1999: 24). This has been the Secretariat response in carrying out the mandate of the Finance and
Investment Protocol. What the experts have pointed out with emphasis is the need for effective
statistical database for current and future use in the macro-economic analysis (Belle undated, p.
86). It is inconsistent monitoring and analysis of macro-economic trends of the region that can
ensure an effective monetary union in SADC. Belle (undated, p. 84) has shown that a research
unit has been created in the Reserve Bank of South Africa to use its sophisticated systems in the
meantime to monitor the activities of member states macro-economics and other banking and
financial trends, thus the flow of monetary activities in the sub-region. This would require the
honest  cooperation  of  accredited  banking  institutions  in  the  sub-region  to  comply  with
expectations from them.  
It is a truism that without strong and effective facilities to track monetary activities in the sub-
region  much  of  the  activities,  especially,  in  trade  and  custom  related  activities  and  their
complexities  would  be  difficult  to  factor  in  an overall  assessment  of  the  region’s  economic
performance  and  the  entire  political  economy  of  SADC.  Many  experts  have  shown  their
satisfaction on the structure in place to regulate and monitor monetary policies and financial
flows across borders. It is in this light that investors and investments can be attracted to trust in
doing business without problems. There are other various technicalities on issues of monetary
union and fiscal policies which are beyond the scope of the review here.
The reality remains, however, that investment policy is still largely determined by member states
at the national level and varies greatly throughout the region. There are issues related to legal
certainty protection for investors, including under domestic law and bilateral investment treaties,
as well as incentives provided to attract investments (which can be used as tools of industrial
policy in some cases). Belle (undated, p. 17) reported that “the broader investment climate in the
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region is therefore also influencing its industrialisation policy development and implementation.
The Finance and Investment Protocol (FIP) is relevant in this regard and some progress has been
made in its implementation as well as the on-going monitoring of progress (including the donor-
supported work of FinMark Trust)”.
While  a  number  of  SADC  countries  have  shown  to  have  improved  their  monetary
competitiveness and business environment in recent years, there remain challenges from policies
that favour local firms (such as black economic empowerment in South Africa and indigenisation
in  Zimbabwe and Namibia)  and create  a  perception  that  FDI  is  not  always  welcome.  Such
national policies in the region tend to act as disincentives to third party investment, hampering
any  initiative  seeking  to  harness  FDI  and  external  partners  to  assist  in  implementing  its
industrialisation priorities (Vanheukelom & Bertelsmann-Scott, 2016: 17, 18). But then without
such policies in operation, the benefit of the integration can hardly address and transform the
condition of the peculiar SADC post-colonial  and post-Apartheid inhumane harms effects, as
such a dilemma to policymakers.
5.3.2 Human Capital Development
With the economic growth objective of SADC having industrialisation as its central development
goal, would require highly skilled technical people and experts, and also other forms of skilled
labour.  What  this  implies  is  that  such august  vision  requires  commensurate  human resource
development  to  avoid  importation  of  human  capital,  and  to  provide  a  job  for  the  many
unemployed people in the sub-region. As industrialisation goes with job creation and who to
employ remain the problem due to a shortage of skilled labour in the region (Vanheukelom &
Bertelsmann-Scott,  2016:  24).  In  fact,  in  South  Africa,  some  areas  in  some  of  the  mining
enclaves reported of the citizens of the area not being employed. The problem has been a lack of
the required skills to match up with duty for a worker to perform. According to Zyuulu (undated,
p. 97) “convergence holds among countries with sound human capital base and use of modern
technology” because that encourages Foreign Direct Investments (FDIs).
Lack  of  skilled  labour  can  have  negative  knocked  on  the  effect  on  investment  policy  and
investment  drive  that  ignores  the  skilled  labour  capitalization  or  training.  Vanheukelom  &
Bertelsmann-Scott  (2016:  17)  argue  that  “some  of  the  potential  benefits  of  Foreign  Direct
Investments (FDI) include the transfer of technology and skills, which are important drivers of
industrialisation.” Skills transfer is not guaranteed unless their people already trained to acquire
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the  relevant  skills  to  be  transferred  through  FDI  projects.  In  considering  the  role  of  skills
transfer, it has been noted that Chinese firms on projects in Africa prefer coming with their own
technicians, artisans and labour. In as much as that has been criticised in some policy circles as
ignoring the local labour; the Chinese, however, are of the view that Africans are not well trained
to handle the way they go about their  duties to save time as efficiency factor.  According to
Broadman et al (2007: 12):
….Africans  and  the  Chinese  and  Indian  investors  operating  on  the  continent  face
significant  challenges  in  effectively  exploiting  such  synergies.  Local  technological
transfers or skills transfers are compromised when foreign skilled workers, brought in
with foreign capital, are not given the resources, let alone the incentives, to engage in
effective  skill  transfers  to  local  workers.  At  the  same  time,  because  of  inadequate
education or training, Africans are often ill-equipped to adopt the new skills even when
such transfers are being attempted.
Besides  the ill-equipped African worker  problem, the Chinese firms depend on loans which
require compliance to time of delivery to avoid excess in interest charges (China’s Foreign Aid
Information  Office  of  the  State  Council,  People’s  Republic  of  China  April  2011).   So
Vanheukelom & Bertelsmann-Scott (2016: 24) posit, “For an industrial policy to be effective,
issues related to skills, labour market regulation and the movement of people in the region will
have to be taken on board” as key drivers of progress and success. South Africa continues to
serve  as  a  major  place  for  skills  development  in  the  sub-region,  yet  South  Africa  with  its
segregation  pre-democracy  backdrop  of  Bantu  education  made  many  African  people  avoid
school. So, there is a massive youth population of previously disadvantaged people not having
any skill training to be employable. Over 54 per cent of 10 million South African youth (age 15
to 24) are unemployed (Le Roux 2017 – Eyewitness News). South Africa, in particular, has weak
public basic education in the sub-region which is also negative knock on the overall regional
leading economy, despite its struggles in recent times, as unemployable youth and people resort
to criminal means to sustenance. Crime can be a serious disincentive to FDIs to the sub-region as
South Africa remains the gateway to the region. The effect also can be evident in the cost in
importing and maintaining highly skilled labour and expatriates from Asia, Western and Eastern
Europe and the Latin Americas into the sub-region.  
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Summary of chapter
Chapter  five  reviewed aspects  of  ECOWAS and SADC integration  process  at  the  economic
sector of the two sub-regions not comparatively. In regard to ECOWAS, its economic integration
is fraught with problems and challenges that are not insurmountable. Much of them relate to FTA
and customs agreement which have stalled due to the Nigerian Government and some of the
member countries delay to ratify the agreement as it stands now. The position has impacted the
monetary union process where the UEMOA, the CFA Zone bloc of monetary union states have
made progress in the harmonization of monetary policies and the WAMZ remain problematic.
That makes it difficult to tell the trend of economic and monetary convergence as positive and
the situation threatens trust in the process, much especially given Abuja lackadaisical stance on
the FTA and customs union ratification on third party issues. The transportation infrastructure
situation is not adequate and appropriate to stir up intra-state trading that is abysmally low in
ECOWAS, and human capital  situation  to  remains  inadequate  and critical  to  supporting  the
integration convergence.
On SADC the  economic  union which  is  the  main  pursuit  of  the  Organisation  also  remains
problematic  over  differences  among  member  states.  SACU members  have  not  been  able  to
convince the non-SACU members into agreements on FTA and SADC customs union on similar
third party issues. Some of the members’ participation in other regional blocs in East and Central
Africa areas confuses the entire process of economic integration convergence thus far. There
remains high distrust among SADC member states over the role of South Africa as the most
powerful economy not only in SADC but on the continent. There remains the lingering shadow
of  Apartheid-era  which  the  ANC Government  despite  being  typical  African,  have  years  to
convince member states about its role as not inward-looking and self-imposition to have its own
ways.  The chapter found SADC and ECOWAS both have brain-drain phenomena and weak
human resource base to tackle the challenges of industrialisation and other economic ventures,
most especially of the scientific-technical base.
100
CHAPTER SIX: WAY FORWARD & CONCLUSION
6.1 Policy Suggestions
This chapter, round-off the dissertation discussions on what role could the ECOWAS and SADC
play  in  facilitating  political  and  economic  convergence  of  the  AU  member  states  with
suggestions and ways forward. The specific areas reviewed are: Regional Stability – Political and
Social; Integration Framework - Legal and Governance Processes; and the Status of Economy -
Economic Convergence, Level of Intra-Regional Trade and Investments; and some lessons (both
positive and negative) have emerged in an attempt in answering the research questions. It is clear
that Africans generally and their leaders understand integration as integrated unity in diversity
around diverse shared values that can spur them onto developmental and economic growth and
not  differences  per  se as  pointed  out  in  chapter  one.  The  case  of  ECOWAS  and  SADC
integration process leadership requires the type that is visionary and capable to transcend its
national interests to embrace a context under its leaderships as one. Such integration leadership
as  exposed  by  the  discussions  should  be  capable  to  guide  the  member  states  out  of  path
dependency,  shadows  of  colonialism  and  prevailing  coloniality  into  new  thinking  towards
essential transformations. A true integration leadership must understand the story of Africans,
and provide guidance in pursuing an integration model,  that is congruent to remove colonial
balkanization barriers preventing African people from interacting,  trading and doing business
without borders on the continent. Presently, that type of Afrocentric leadership becomes missing
within the discussion because it is the leadership type that embodies answers. On that note before
concluding  with  what  the  answers  are  the  following  lessons  and  way  forward  could  aid
policymakers involved in the integration and stakeholders at large.
6.2 ECOWAS Lessons and Way Forward onto African Integration
The political  convergence  of  ECOWAS has  been impressive  as  a  voluntary  undertaking for
member states. After having started with the aim as economic, the involvements of experts and
scholars convinced the politicians to concede to the idea of political integration, (as much as that
is most likely to happen as a normal outcome of economic integration pursuit).  Whilst some
literature  has  been  critical  of  the  pace  of  the  entire  ECOWAS  political  and  economic
convergence, others are of the view that the sub-region political convergence policies have gone
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far to inspire many programmes of the African Union (ECA-WA, 2015: 16). Hartmann (2013:
46) for example says:
ECOWAS’s inception did not follow a template developed from somewhere else, even if
international  consultants  participated  in  developing  the  Revised  Treaty  and  the
Mechanism for Conflict Prevention. On the contrary, much of what we find in the texts is
homegrown and has inspired the development of norms at the continental level (African
Union).
That laudable commendation of ECOWAS integration as a home grown model remains to be
justified  of  its  effectiveness.  That  cannot  happen  unless  the  leaders  of  the  member  states
themselves see the need for that to happen.  Some issues of national self-interests that persist
with Abuja, and have caused serious frustrations in regard to FTA, tariffs and non-tariffs treaty
implementations  point  where Nigeria’s  leadership  role  has been almost  abdicated.  The other
members of the sub-region belonging to other economic blocs must endeavour to consider the
integration has much to offer the sub-region in the long-term considering the entire global trends
where regionalisation and regionalism have become the order globally. The dwindling economic
and political capacity of some of the states and prevailing situation of acute underdevelopment in
ECOWAS peripheries can be surmounted only in a united approach, to deal with the nature of
challenges  beyond  the  nation-state  capacity  and  ability,  at  such  supranational  level  with
improved  accountable  regional  governance  machinery.  In  view of  these  concerns  raised  the
following policy suggestions have been suggested:
i. The need to encourage civil society participation in the integration process is overdue; as
well as the private sector. What some literature find is that the lack of the civil society
inputs and the private sector in implementation lobbying goes to enable the politicians to
slow down the integration process, and issues of “shadow state” are made possible due to
the over-politicization of the integration process at  the national  Heads of states level.
Söderbaum (2004) who has done much advocacy research in that area, found that giving
room  for  the  civil  society  participation  in  integration  process  hastens  the  various
convergence processes, counting the benefit it has for the common person, communities
and the societies within a region.
ii.  The issue of trade liberalisation and the monetary union has become the main bone of
contention in ECOWAS convergence implementation. Nigerian traders associations and
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the possibility of “shadow state” interests stand challenged by elimination remains not
just major barrier as organized groups, but it is a war in itself as rent-seeking patronage
has little or no room within the economic convergence.  Hence the supposedly deliberate
delays continue to cause and retain frustration at member states custom borders. That
enables corruption to continue by the kind of non-uniform mode of custom practices at
borders. In this case, non-political stakeholders (as pointed in item i.), must find means to
influence  the  politicians  and  use  other  suitable  advocacy  methods  to  push  for
implementations.  The  integration  good  side  is  how  the  positive  impact  of  trade
liberalisation, and eased customs procedures can enhance ordinary people doing business
across the borders and much to that to hasten intra-regional trade which currently remains
low and insignificant over problems uncorrected.
iii. On  the  side  of  transportation  and  infrastructure,  in  particular,  the  observance  that  it
contributes  much  to  lack  of  adequate  intra-trade  among  ECOWAS  member  states
deserves  much  attention.  By  and  large,  the  benefits  of  integration  as  other  regions
globally shows is how member states are enabled to increase and engage intra-regional
trade activities to boost their economies and enhance strategic importance. The reliance
on mainly external offshore trade by individual  member states renders the ECOWAS
region strategically vulnerable. To correct the trend requires the needed attention giving
to the infrastructure development plans. Also, as much of the funding at this stage may
come from external sources, achieving economic convergence could make it easier, and
accountability rendered through integration that has reached an appreciable stage and is
workable.
iv. The problem of inadequate capacity and skills shortage has been noted as contributing to
the slow pace of the convergence in various ECOWAS project sectors. Indeed, as much
as ECOWAS too has experience brain-drain, the flight of youth to the West, poor school
system, thus, training that are nothing less than incompetency do not augur for planned
industrialisation and the effective running of various projects  under the Secretariat  as
having been pointed  out  by some experts.  The effort  to improve school  systems and
improved education at various levels could be better done under the integrated region
than the cases remain now.   
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6.3 SADC Lessons and Way Forward onto African Integration
As SADC is the sub-region that researchers and experts among other stakeholders of the region
are harshly critical means it is time to for the sub-region to wake-up (Vuka). The orientation of
SADC and its  formation  is  unique and distinctive,  given its  colonization  that  integrated  the
region with minority European people and their domination over Centuries to the latter part of
the Twentieth Century. So as much as of SADC structures still remain unreformed, in a colonial
manner after political liberation and democratization into democracy. That is not conducive to
encourage  progress  into  integration  that  normally  requires  major  reforms  for  development
transformation. SADC remains the region with about five of its members (Namibia, Lesotho,
Botswana and Swaziland) having a very small population that affects macro-economy by lack of
capacity and internal market size on their own. Notwithstanding the region is privileged to have
the most industrialised and powerful economy in Africa situated there as South Africa. Even
though SADC initial members have later co-opted other states like Oil-rich Angola and mineral-
rich DRC, their enrollment has not contributed to any significant progress, if not a mirage in the
wake  of  intractable  political  conflict  in  the  DRC.  However,  experts  believe  in  spite  of
demographical weakness, institutional and structural weaknesses, SADC could have transcended
its challenges by being serious with its integration process, that is not near anywhere around
convergence. Integration is the most reliable and better avenue to surmount acute developmental
backlogs, that saddles the region as political and economic challenges.  SADC need to make
effort to reverse diminishing human living standards and diseases. SADC remains lackadaisical
heuristic project with strong political personality differences, an issue that experts find should
not have been the case; taking the similarities within the context with very minimal neo-colonial
interference by France through its former colonies unlike ECOWAS. In view of these pertinent
concerns the following policy suggestions (some have been raised already by Kayira (1993) and
cited in Odén (1996: 17-18) have been raised as reaffirmation in additions to new ones as the
outcome of the study for SADC:
v. SADC economic and trade policies have been inward-looking among member states, due
to persisting liberationist sentiments and ideologies that constraint most of the current
SADC leaders into old path dependency. That attitude has become an acute hindrance to
the political commitment required to implement reforming economic policies, designed
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to expand intra-regional trade. The suggestion for radical reforms that diminishes narrow
parochial sovereign so the interests of states and individuals are essential.
vi. The various experts see that some progress made on the reduction of tariff barriers has
not squared well with apparent rigidity on the non-tariff barriers. These have been made
difficult by the diverse economic blocs such as SACU and COMESA that contributes to
division among SADC members. Other members have multi-membership in other sub-
regional Organisations that diminish their  commitment to SADC economic matters as
members  (namely,  DRC  and  Angola).  As  much  as  SADC  emphasis  on  excessive
sovereignty,  to demand the commitment  of members  would require  ample reason for
what they stand to benefit. And that is not the situation now as the small economy states
still have their doubt about the post-Apartheid and new democratic South Africa. This
also raises much concern, as the current ruling ANC government had massive support
from the same member states, that had their independence earlier to achieve majority rule
in South Africa. The level of distrust that contributes to stalling SADC progress can only
be  attributed  to  interpersonal  and  idiosyncratic  differences  among  leaders  of  SADC
member states.
vii. The  colonial  patterns  of  industrial  planning,  location  and  infrastructure  system  still
persist, especially in Zimbabwe where the loudness of industrialisation is made strong by
the  leaders.  For  SADC actually  to  be  able  to  pursue  its  vision  would  require  not  a
template or typology of the past to transplant; but new reforms in the way of doing things
that come with a radical approach, capable to meet standards and the height of change in
the global system in thinking about export-oriented projects. In addition, plans should
consider the cultural relevance of the context that development planning is homegrown
and participatory; and not Weberian top-down (and red-tape manner) activities which are
inimical  to  the  contemporary  ways  of  management  and administration  to  sustainable
development thinking.
viii. Much of SADC weakness has arisen out of the weak capacity of the Secretariat and its
other projects Organs. SADC has serious brain-drain, especially Zimbabwe which has
trained  many  scholars  and  experts  in  various  disciplines  and  professions,  and  South
Africa  too  with  its  post-Apartheid  backlog  of  unschooled  previously  disadvantaged
people. The later also faces the problem of educational system output quality especially at
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the basic level in mostly the rural areas in the majority. Taking these examples (and with
the  exception  of  Swaziland)  suffice  that  other  states  are  all  not  impressive  in  skills
training structures, and to surmount some of these challenges in meeting the integration
process skills needs, would require the leaders to recognize the need to play down on
personalising the integration process and reducing politicisation of the novel attempt to
unite the region for effective economic growth and sustainable development. 
ix. Financial  experts  have  cited  the  role  of  South  Africa  in  the  integration  as  crucial  to
guarantee  secured  and  effective  monetary  concerns.  But  still,  some  appreciable
improvement  in  meeting  the  requirements  towards  possibly  distance  monetary  union,
require  some states  doing  much  to  improve  monetary  management  and  banking  and
financial  systems.  The  need  for  South  Africa  with  its  international  reputation  in  the
financial sector could provide not just oversight role but institutional capacity training
required  for  the  countries  still  weak  and faces  challenges  beyond  their  capability  to
handle on their own financial institutions independently now.
x. SADC though have countries like South Africa where the level of its young democracy is
excellent in recognizing the concerns of civil society and NGOs, and to the greater extent
the  influential  role  of  the  private  sector;  it  is  not  the  same across  the  sub-region  as
democratization actually  varies across the region. Also in South Africa,  though some
leftist  oriented  critics  find  the  private  sector’s  role  as  neoliberal  agenda,  yet  still  an
effective integration cannot only be a political game when the entire arrangement is to
benefit the non-state structures working the economy. In as much as the civil society and
the  private  sector  are  stakeholders  to  the  integration  and the  greater  benefit  to  them
should  make SADC open up to  these  structures  in  the  region.  Their  involvement  as
already discussed elsewhere should be part of the sub-region capacity and their concerns
could  help  hasten  the  integration,  and infuse life  into  the  process  from it’s  over  the
politicised state now, far from a regional business.
6.4 Lessons to AU on ECOWAS and SADC Integration 
xi. The issues of economic power asymmetry, apparent national interests (inward-looking),
lack of post-colonial restructuring of some public institutions and approach to using same
colonial template, the problem of colonial paternalism caused by excessive dependency,
and the challenge with human resource development that is Afrocentric and tailored to
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peculiar development issues on the continent are factors that the AU must deal with, as it
considers the supranational convergence of the AU in the future. Though there are some
few significant lessons learnt from the ECOWAS’s approach to political convergence, by
and large, the two case-studies do not carry the adequate picture that merit emulation and
lack the leadership and promise to actually inspire AU supranational integration in the
near future, but not impossible with corrective measures.8 
6.5 Conclusions
The conclusion of the dissertation at this final stage integrates the two parallel studies done. The
salient issues coming out of the study have raised some lessons only a few could be listed in the
previous section; because of the economy of words and space allocated the report. The study
utilized  the principles  of  systems change theory mainly to  review the integration  process  of
ECOWAS and SADC integration on how each of their experience could provide inspiration for
the overall continental integration under the AU. Certain other concepts were used like Power
Concerns;  Functional  Efficiency  Concerns;  Legitimacy  and  Signaling  Concerns;  and
Neopatrimonial Concerns which enabled regional powers and leadership to be scrutinized for
their  rationale and commitment in the regional integration processes. These instruments have
helped  to  understand issues  of  change and why there  should  be  and when they have  to  be
changed in a region as a human system, which makes them organic and subject to imperative
needs and grows naturally.  Hence,  the review could have been much extensive than this but
meticulous consideration has been applied to limit the areas of relevance to salient factors that
can be reasonably assessed based on challenges of period and human needs considerations. 
As much as ECOWAS and SADC differ on several grounds, what matters  and appear to be
similar is their need for economic development and sustainable development required to meet
growing human socio-economic needs and solutions to economic distress; and the imperative to
respond to dynamic changes  in  a  global  economy and political  systems.  The pressure being
exerted by globalisation and its free market and liberalisation requires collective or galvanized
regional force to restrain its imperialistic demands, which transcends the nation-state capacity
and  ability  in  Sub-Saharan  Africa  today.  The  continent  evinces  the  weakness  that  is  a
consequence of being partitioned by Balkanization into narrow exploitable  states, away from
8 According to “Update on the Continental Free Trade Area (CFTA)” of the AU the CFTA item 8, i., “Finalization 
of the East African Community (EAC)- the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA)-Southern 
African Development Community (SADC) Tripartite FTA,” shall determine operationalization of the CFTA.
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being viable systems of interdependency and integrated group of nations. In response to what
Nkrumah foresaw over sixty years back, as the need to integrate Africa into a single union to
counter  the  onset  of  globalisation  that  time,  has  inevitably  become  the  reality  facing  the
continent’s main intergovernmental body, the AU. The AU’s chance of integration would depend
on the success of various sub-regional experiments ongoing, to achieve that level of regional
convergence in the economy and supranational governance. Notwithstanding the relevance of
sub-regional intergovernmental organisation to start with, some of Africa leaders like Gadhafi
and some scholars have particularly expressed their doubt about the key leading states of the
ECOWAS (Nigeria) and SADC (South Africa).  Some of these perceptions nevertheless have
been proved valid by the manner Nigeria and South Africa have remained partially obstacles to
the issues of economic convergence,  in particularly;  and on the leadership compromises  and
sacrifices, they both have to make to achieve an integration, which equally will have long-term
benefit for them and the currently weak member states.  Nigeria and South Africa are required to
make  adjustments  to  ensure  entire  regions  are  lifted  viably.  The  fact  remains  that  the  two
dominant states in the two sub-regions have previous unfair trade arrangements with the weak
states within the domains. It is this correction and adjustments required to facilitate economic
convergence  that  stands  challenged.  There  is  no  doubt  that  behaviour  can  become  another
setback at the continental level, where already South Africa has been dubbed the “big brother”
and what about Abuja?
Some of the shortfalls and obstruction issues which may not be regional power problem have
been pointed out in the previous section on the proposed suggestions. But what needs to be spelt
out clearly is the manner leadership on the continent has since the independence of majority
African states remains a bane to development than a boon; because of how politics, management
of  the  state  and  development  matters  have  been  personalized  and  resulted  in  rent-seeking
patronage in some economic resourced African states. This has been widely recounted in diverse
literature. The concern here is the need to see a change that is not only to galvanize the sub-
regional countries to achieve integration as a new force to enable and enhance economic growth
and sustainable development on the continent.  But to diminish the political patronage that serves
as a state-sponsored criminal  ring in the countries  to siphon the state  coffers and misuse its
institutions to the economic detriment of the majority of citizens. Therefore the good side of
integration  is  being  resisted through leadership  and clienteles.  “So Adotevi  (1997:  57)  says,
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“Integration cannot be achieved without enlisting the feelings of community and cultural affinity
that  are  so deeply  rooted  in  Africa’s  history,  and the  great  challenge  in  promoting  regional
integration in Africa is therefore to find ways of fostering these feelings of community, which
transcend national borders, without threatening the viability of the state.” Therefore, the case of
ECOWAS  and  the  SADC  outlook  has  been  much  of  inward-looking;  and  such  audacious
behaviour can only serve as a stumbling block to the AU’s supraregional integration, and raise
further doubts than encouragement. These are the two main nations that can make Africa realize
the dream of integration if they want that to happen by how they conduct the heuristic sub-
regional cases to their success as African made integrations.
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